NOTE

Compare Millsap v. National Funding Corp., 57 Cal. App. 2d 772, 776, 135 P.2d 407 (1943):

Where the prospective employee clearly states to his prospective employer, as in the case before us, that he will not give up his present employment unless the prospective employer will agree to give him permanent employment and the prospective employer expressly agrees to those terms, it seems clear that the prospective employee (to paraphrase the language of section 1605 Civil Code) in giving up his present employment suffers a prejudice as an inducement to the promisor for his promise of permanent employment. "It is not necessary to the existence of a good consideration that a benefit should be conferred upon the promisor. It is enough that a 'prejudice be suffered or agreed.to be suffered' by the promisee." (6 Cal.  Jur. 171.)

On the other hand, in Forrer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967), where the plaintiff alleged that he gave up his farming operation at a loss on the strength of the defendant's promise to provide him with permanent employment, the court held that although it "would not hesitate to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel under these facts if justice required it . . . [j]ustice . . . does not require the invocation of the doctrine, for the promise of the defendant was kept, and this court is not required, therefore, to enforce it." Id. at 392, 153 N.W.2d at 589. The court went on to point out that the presumption that a contract for permanent employment is terminable at will is based on public policy grounds, and laid down the rule that "a permanent employment contract is terminable at will unless there is additional consideration in the form of an economic or financial benefit to the employer. A mere detriment to the employee is not enough." Id. at 394,153 N.W.2d at 590.