What’s a tort? It’s a wrong that a court is prepared to recognize, usually in the form of ordering the transfer of money (“damages”) from the wrongdoer to the wronged. The court is usually alerted to wrong by the filing of a lawsuit: anyone can walk through the courthouse doors and, subject to the limits explored in civil procedure, call someone else (or, if a company, something) to account.
The first section of our course deals with that group of torts known as intentional. We’ll review the spectrum of intent that marks the sometimes-fuzzy boundaries among wrongs that are done intentionally, those done merely “negligently,” and others in between, and also have a chance to think about what kinds of damages should be on the table once a wrong is established. What happens when an act that’s only a little bit wrongful, even while intentional, results in unexpectedly large harm?
We’ll also discuss the sources that courts turn to in order to answer such questions. Rarely, in tort cases, are those sources the ones laypeople expect: statutes passed by legislatures. Without statutes to guide them, what are courts left with?
Should defendants be liable for unforeseeable injuries?
80 Wis. 523
50 N.W. 403
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.4
Nov. 17, 1891.5
Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha county; A. SCOTT SLOAN, Judge. Reversed.6
Action by Andrew Vosburg against George Putney for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.7
The action was brought to recover damages for an assault and battery, alleged to have been committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20, 1889. The answer is a general denial. At the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff was a little more than 14 years of age, and the defendant a little less than 12 years of age. The injury complained of was caused by a kick inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee. The transaction occurred in a school-room in Waukesha, during school hours, both parties being pupils in the school. A former trial of the cause resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,800. The defendant appealed from such judgment to this court, and the same was reversed for error, and a new trial awarded. 78 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. The case has been again tried in the circuit court, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $2,500. The facts of the case, as they appeared on both trials, are sufficiently stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice ORTON on the former appeal, and require no repetition. On the last trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows: “(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2) Had such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the result of such injury? A. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff's right leg become inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the defendant? A. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff's leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend to do him any harm? A. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-five hundred dollars.” The defendant moved for judgment in his favor on the verdict, and also for a new trial. The plaintiff moved for judgment on the verdict in his favor. The motions of defendant were overruled, and that of the plaintiff granted. Thereupon judgment for plaintiff, for $2,500 damages and costs of suit, was duly entered. The defendant appeals from the judgment. [50 N.W. 403] M. S. Griswold and T. W. Haight, ( J. V. Quarles, of counsel,) for appellant, to sustain the proposition that where there is no evil intent there can be no recovery, cited: 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 82-85; 2 Add. Torts, § 790; Cooley, Torts, p. 162; Coward v. Baddeley, 4 Hurl. & N. 478; Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 473; Hoffman v. Eppers, 41 Wis. 251;Krall v. Lull, 49 Wis. 405, 5 N. W. Rep. 874; Crandall v. Transportation Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 75; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292.9
Ryan & Merton, for respondent.10
Several errors are assigned, only three of which will be considered.12
I. The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that defendant's motion for judgment on the special verdict should have been granted. In support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule that “the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault.” Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere assaults. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery. In such case the rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also unlawful. Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of [50 N.W. 404] the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play-grounds. But it appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful. Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and verdict, the action may be sustained.13
II. The plaintiff testified, as a witness in his own behalf, as to the circumstances of the alleged injury inflicted upon him by the defendant, and also in regard to the wound he received in January, near the same knee, mentioned in the special verdict. The defendant claimed that such wound was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff's leg, in that it produced a diseased condition of the bone, which disease was in active progress when he received the kick, and that such kick did nothing more than to change the location, and perhaps somewhat hasten the progress, of the disease. The testimony of Dr. Bacon, a witness for plaintiff, (who was plaintiff's attending physician,) elicited on cross-examination, tends to some extent to establish such claim. Dr. Bacon first saw the injured leg on February 25th, and Dr. Philler, also one of plaintiff's witnesses, first saw it March 8th. Dr. Philler was called as a witness after the examination of the plaintiff and Dr. Bacon. On his direct examination he testified as follows: “I heard the testimony of Andrew Vosburg in regard to how he received the kick, February 20th, from his playmate. I heard read the testimony of Miss More, and heard where he said he received this kick on that day.” (Miss More had already testified that she was the teacher of the school, and saw defendant standing in the aisle by his seat, and kicking across the aisle, hitting the plaintiff.) The following question was then propounded to Dr. Philler: “After hearing that testimony, and what you know of the case of the boy, seeing it on the 8th day of March, what, in your opinion, was the exciting cause that produced the inflammation that you saw in that boy's leg on that day?” An objection to this question was overruled, and the witness answered: “The exciting cause was the injury received at that day by the kick on the shin-bone.” It will be observed that the above question to Dr. Philler calls for his opinion as a medical expert, based in part upon the testimony of the plaintiff, as to what was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff's leg. The plaintiff testified to two wounds upon his leg, either of which might have been such proximate cause. Without taking both of these wounds into consideration, the expert could give no intelligent or reliable opinion as to which of them caused the injury complained of; yet, in the hypothetical question propounded to him, one of these probable causes was excluded from the consideration of the witness, and he was required to give his opinion upon an imperfect and insufficient hypothesis,--one which excluded from his consideration a material fact essential to an intelligent opinion. A consideration by the witness of the wound received by the plaintiff in January being thus prevented, the witness had but one fact upon which to base his opinion, to-wit, the fact that defendant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone. Based, as it necessarily was, on that fact alone, the opinion of Dr. Philler that the kick caused the injury was inevitable, when, had the proper hypothesis been submitted to him, his opinion might have been different. The answer of Dr. Philler to the hypothetical question put to him may have had, probably did have, a controlling influence with the jury, for they found by their verdict that his opinion was correct. Surely there can be no rule of evidence which will tolerate a hypothetical question to an expert, calling for his opinion in a matter vital to the case, which excludes from his consideration facts already proved by a witness upon whose testimony such hypothetical question is based, when a consideration of such facts by the expert is absolutely essential to enable him to form an intelligent opinion concerning such matter. The objection to the question put to Dr. Philler should have been sustained. The error in permitting the witness to answer the question is material, and necessarily fatal to the judgment.14
III. Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff. The court refused to submit such questions to the jury. The ruling was correct. The rule of damages in actions for torts was held in Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. Rep. 356, 911, to be that the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. The chief justice and the writer of this opinion dissented from the judgment in that case, chiefly because we were of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action ex contractu, and not ex delicto, and hence that a different rule of damages--the rule here contended for -- was applicable. We did not question that the rule in actions for tort was correctly stated. That case rules this on the question of damages. The remaining errors assigned are upon the rulings of the court on objections to testimony. These rulings are not very likely to be repeated on another trial, and are not of sufficient importance to require a review of them on this appeal. The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.
Should damages for battery encompass indignities as well as physical injuries? Should juries be able to assign extra damages for particularly malicious or bad-natured conduct?
63 Ill. 553
1872 WL 8247 (Ill.)
Supreme Court of Illinois.4
June Term, 1872.5
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. SILAS L. BRYAN, Judge, presiding.6
Messrs. SHAW, HAYWARD & SMITH, for the appellant.7
Messrs. WILSON & HUTCHINSON, and Mr. JONATHAN PALMER, for the appellee.8
Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:9
The ground mainly relied on for the reversal of the judgment in this case is, that the damages are excessive, being $1000.10
The case presented is this: There was a trial of an action of trespass between the parties, wherein the appellee was defendant, in the circuit court of Jasper county. At the close of the trial the court adjourned, and, immediately upon the adjournment, in the court room, in the presence of a large number of persons, the appellant deliberately spat in the face of the appellee.11
So long as damages are allowable in any civil case, by way of punishment or for the sake of example, the present, of all cases, would seem to be a most fit one for the award of such damages. [63 Ill. 554] The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only means of redress.12
Suitors, in the assertion of their rights, should be allowed approach to the temple of justice without incurring there exposure to such disgraceful indignities, in the very presence of its ministers.13
It is customary to instruct juries that they may give vindictive damages where there are circumstances of malice, wilfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong complained of. The act in question was wholly made up of such qualities. It was one of pure malignity, done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity.14
An exasperated suitor has indulged the gratification of his malignant feelings in this despicable mode. The act was the very refinement of malice. The defendant appears to be a man of wealth; we can not say that he has been made to pay too dearly for the indulgence.15
We have carefully looked into the instructions given and refused, and do not perceive any substantial error in respect to them.16
The judgment must be affirmed.17
Should intentional contact with an object attached to the plaintiff constitute battery? For the tort of assault, should we consider if defendant intended to cause apprehension in the plaintiff?
654 A.2d 690
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Feb. 9, 1995.
 Peter M. Cosel, Donato D'Andrea, Newport, for plaintiff.
Lauren E. Jones, Jones Associates, Brenda Coville Harrigan, Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Robert S. Thurston, Jones Associates, Providence, for defendant.3
This case came before the Supreme Court on the appeal of Jesse Silvia (defendant) from a judgment against him for assault and battery, for compensatory damages in the amount of $60,346, and for punitive damages in the amount of $6,350, plus interest and costs. We affirm the judgment in respect to the assault and battery but sustain the defendant's appeal in respect to damages. We vacate the award of damages and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial on damages.6
This case began eight years ago with a broken signal light. The plaintiff, Victorie A. Picard, brought her mother's car to Barry Pontiac-Buick, Inc. (Barry Pontiac) in Newport, Rhode Island, where the car had been purchased, to have the light repaired. While the car was being repaired, plaintiff decided to have its annual inspection performed as well. The car failed this inspection because, according to a Barry Pontiac representative, the brakes needed to be replaced. The plaintiff brought the car to Kent's Alignment Service (Kent's Alignment), also located in Newport, where the car passed inspection.8
The plaintiff then contacted a local television news "troubleshooter" reporter, presumably to report her experience at the two inspection sites. Shortly after Kent's Alignment had inspected plaintiff's car, Barry Pontiac phoned Kent's Alignment to ask that the car be checked again and the sticker removed because the brakes "were bad." Accordingly Edward Kent (Kent), the owner of Kent's Alignment, set January 27, 1987, as the date that plaintiff, accompanied by her goddaughter Kristen Ann Seyster (Seyster), returned with the car to Kent's garage.9
Kent's Alignment was divided into a garage area separated by a glass partition from an office area. At the time of the incident at issue in this case, Seyster was in the office, while plaintiff was in the garage. After Kent inspected the car, he told plaintiff that he had been asked to call Barry Pontiac which also wished to inspect the brakes. Ray Stevens (Stevens), the service manager at Barry Pontiac arrived at Kent's Alignment, accompanied by defendant, who was employed by Barry Pontiac.10
 The defendant began to inspect the brakes. He and plaintiff gave vastly different descriptions of what next happened. The plaintiff said she began to take a picture of defendant as he was facing away from her, presumably as evidence for the troubleshooter report. The plaintiff testified that she did intend to photograph defendant although the photograph was not intended to identify defendant. The photograph did, however, clearly show defendant fully facing the camera, standing upright while pointing his index finger at plaintiff. After the camera snapped, the events that gave rise to this case occurred.11
The plaintiff testified that defendant "lunged" at her and "grabbed [her] around around [sic] the shoulders," although plaintiff did not experience any pain. The plaintiff then testified on cross-examination that after defendant grabbed her by both her shoulders, she and defendant "spun around wrestling." According to plaintiff, defendant released her after someone said, "let her go." The plaintiff then left the garage with her goddaughter.12
Seyster and Stevens also testified at trial, and Kent's deposition was admitted into evidence. Seyster, who had remained in the office area, testified that she saw defendant "grab her [plaintiff's] left shoulder and try to get the picture with his other hand," but defendant did not touch either the photograph or the camera. Seyster further testified that defendant had reached for plaintiff with only one arm, not two, and that plaintiff was not spun around, shaken, picked up or thrown against a wall. Stevens testified that he did not see what transpired because his back was turned. He did, however, remember defendant "hollering" that he did not want his picture taken. Kent stated that after plaintiff came out of the office and attempted to photograph defendant, he heard defendant say something such as "don't take my picture." Kent then saw defendant reach for the camera and touch it, but saw no contact between plaintiff and defendant, nor did he see defendant lift plaintiff.13
The defendant testified that as he was looking at the car, plaintiff had come up behind him and aimed the camera toward him. He then pointed at plaintiff and said, "who gave you permission to take my picture?" then walked around the car to plaintiff, placed his index finger on the camera and again asked, "who gave you permission to take my picture?" The defendant denied grabbing plaintiff, touching her body, threatening her or making any threatening gestures, scuffling with her or reaching for the photograph. He also testified that he did not intend to cause plaintiff any bodily harm.14
The plaintiff testified that although she did not experience any pain immediately after the incident, she did experience numbness in her hips and legs. However, about a week after the incident, plaintiff visited William E. Kenney, M.D. (Kenney) because of "pain radiating down my right leg * * *," pain that reportedly continued periodically up to the time of trial. Kenney examined plaintiff and advised a CAT scan. W.R. Courey, M.D., of St. Anne's Hospital in Fall River, Massachusetts, prepared a radiology report on April 17, 1987, that described "[g]eneralized degenerative bulging of the annulus at [L-3-L-4, L-4-L-5 and L-5-S-1]." Kenney himself saw plaintiff five times in his office between January 30, 1987, and May 26, 1987, each time with a $30 charge.15
On April 28, 1987, Kenney wrote a "To Whom it May Concern" letter, in which he stated:16
"This patient had had a ruptured intervertebra disc on the left which was apparent in October or earlier of 1985. She had not complained of her right lower extremity, however, on 1/30/87 she was seen with a history that she had been assaulted on 1/22/87 and had pain in the right lower extremity. The CAT scan taken at St. Anne's Hospital on 4/17/87 reveals nerve root pressure on the right at L5-S1 level. Therefore, this change is probably causally related with the assault."
On June 1, 1987, Kenney wrote a second "To Whom it May Concern" letter, stating: "The question has been raised as to whether or not the pain in the right leg is permanent. The answer is that it is probably not permanent, but there is no way that I have of knowing for sure whether it is permanent or not." (Emphasis added.) But, twenty-four days later, with no evidence of an intervening examination of plaintiff, Kenney, on June 25, 1987, wrote to plaintiff's attorney:18
"It is apparent that the patient sustained a ruptured disc on the right at L5-S1 found by CAT scan on 4/17/87, following an assault on 1/22/87. The ruptured disc at L5-S1 on the right is a permanent injury." (Emphasis added.)
The injured area identified by Kenney was the right L5-S1 region of the spinal column. The defendant introduced into evidence a Newport Hospital Report dated March 26, 1985, which showed a left-sided disc herniation at the L5-S1 locus. The plaintiff confirmed at trial that she had had a history of back problems for at least ten years prior to her encounter with defendant.20
On January 6, 1993, some five and one-half years after he last examined plaintiff, Kenney again wrote to plaintiff's counsel and stated:21
"To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, in my opinion, the ruptured disc Victorie Picard sustained at L5-S1 was proximately caused by the assault of January 22, 1987. The injury sustained on January 22, 1987, in my opinion, stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty is permanent in nature."
On January 11, 1993, Kenney swore an affidavit entitled: "Amended Affidavit Under Section 9-17-27 [sic] of the Rhode Island General Laws Entitled 'Evidence of Charges for Medical and Hospital Services' " that amended his affidavit of 1987. Attached to the amended affidavit were Kenney's letter of January 6, 1993, the radiology report from St. Anne's Hospital dated April 17, 1987, and the receipts from plaintiff's five visits to Kenney's office. The original affidavit had contained receipts of the office visits, Kenney's letters of June 25, 1987, June 1, 1987, and April 28, 1987, the radiology report and a letter of May 5, 1987, describing the radiology report.23
The amended affidavit stated in part:24
"Now comes William E. Kenney, M.D. and makes affidavit under oath and says as follows: * * *
(3) That the attached record of examination of the person examined reflects my true opinion with respect to the diagnosis, prognosis, and proximate cause of the conditions diagnosed.
(4) That to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the condition detailed in the attached record, related in the history provided by the patient, was the proximate result of the incident which occurred on January 22, 1987."
Other than plaintiff's testimony, these affidavits and their appended records and letters, admitted into evidence by the trial judge, constituted the only medical evidence that documented plaintiff's alleged injury. Kenney was not deposed, nor did he testify at trial.26
The plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $60,346. Because the trial justice found that defendant's conduct was "sufficiently egrigious [sic]," punitive damages in the amount of $6,350 were imposed, for a total judgment of $66,696, plus interest and costs. The defendant appealed the judgment, arguing (1) that plaintiff failed to prove an assault and battery; (2) that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's actions in fact caused the alleged harm to her; and (3) that the damage awards were grossly excessive and inappropriate as a matter of law.27
The findings made by a trial justice, sitting without a jury, are accorded great weight. Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 579, 350 A.2d 397, 399 (1976). These findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent a determination that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. Rego Displays,  Inc. v. Fournier, 119 R.I. 469, 473, 379 A.2d 1098, 1100-01 (1977); Barattini v. McGovern, 110 R.I. 360, 362, 292 A.2d 860, 861 (1972).29
The defendant contended that plaintiff failed to prove the occurrence of an assault because plaintiff was not placed in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm. Further, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to prove a battery because the evidence failed to establish that defendant intended to inflict an unconsented touching of plaintiff. We disagree with both contentions.31
Assault and battery are separate acts, usually arising from the same transaction, each having independent significance. Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I.1983). "An assault is a physical act of a threatening nature or an offer of corporal injury which puts an individual in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm." Id. It is a plaintiff's apprehension of injury which renders a defendant's act compensable. Id.; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984) ("[t]he damages recoverable for [assault] are those for the plaintiff's mental disturbance, including fright, humiliation and the like, as well as any physical illness which may result from them"). This apprehension must be the type of fear normally aroused in the mind of a reasonable person. Keeton et al., supra, at 44.32
The plaintiff testified that she was frightened by defendant's actions. A review of the attendant circumstances attests that such a reaction was reasonable. The defendant admitted approaching plaintiff, and the photograph taken that day clearly showed defendant pointing his finger at plaintiff as defendant approached her. Because plaintiff's apprehension of imminent bodily harm was reasonable at that point, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of assault.33
We have defined battery as an act that was intended to cause, and in fact did cause, "an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of the assault. * * * An intent to injure plaintiff, however, is unnecessary in a situation in which a defendant willfully sets in motion a force that in its ordinary course causes the injury." Proffitt, 463 A.2d at 517.34
In the instant case, defendant contended that a battery did not occur because defendant did not intend to touch or injure plaintiff. Rather, defendant argued, the evidence showed that he intended to touch plaintiff's camera, not plaintiff's person, and therefore the contact was insufficient to prove battery. With this contention we must disagree. Even if this court were to accept defendant's characterization of the incident, a battery had nonetheless occurred. The defendant failed to prove that his actions on January 22, 1987, were accidental or involuntary. Therefore, defendant's offensive contact with an object attached to or identified with plaintiff's body was sufficient to constitute a battery. As noted in the comments to the Restatement (Second) Torts § 18, comment c at 31 (1965):35
"Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other's person and therefore as partaking of its inviolability is actionable as an offensive contact with his person. There are some things such as clothing or a cane or, indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are so intimately connected with one's body as to be universally regarded as part of the person." (Emphasis added.)
The defendant's contact with the camera clutched in plaintiff's hand was thus sufficient to constitute a battery. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiff has proven the elements of assault and battery.37
The defendant next asserted that evidence was insufficient to prove that his actions caused plaintiff's condition because the medical evidence submitted by plaintiff was  not competent. We agree.39
At the start of trial, defendant objected to the admission of Kenney's January 11, 1993 affidavit which refers to Kenney's opinions to the permanency of plaintiff's condition. The record disclosed that Kenney last examined plaintiff on May 26, 1987, but included no evidence that Kenney examined plaintiff at any time during the ensuing five and one-half year period before executing the affidavit. At the time of trial Kenney had been retired for six years and resided in Massachusetts. It is an impermissible affront to reason to uphold Kenney's affidavit which attested to the cause and permanency of injury in a patient whom he had not treated in five and one-half years and whose medical file he apparently did not consult at the time he signed the affidavit. Furthermore, the material which supported the affidavit was substantively inconsistent. Kenney's 1993 letter stated that the injury to plaintiff was "permanent in nature." However, in support of the 1987 affidavit, shortly after his last examination of plaintiff, he wrote on June 1, 1987, that the injury was "probably not permanent." Yet, twenty-four days later, without reexamining plaintiff, he stated in a letter to plaintiff's attorney, that the injury was permanent, a position which he maintained until 1993, though he never reexamined plaintiff in the intervening five and one-half years.40
In Parrillo v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 518 A.2d 354, 355 (R.I.1986), this court stated that, "The substitution of a written affidavit for live medical testimony * * * in no way relaxes the minimum requirements for the admission of competent medical testimony." Further, we have noted that, "Although all litigants have the right to take advantage of the provisions of § 9-19-27, they run the risk of a failure of proof unless the medical picture is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to lend itself to this simplified manner of proof." Id. at 356. In the instant case, the conflicting descriptions by Kenney concerning the permanency of plaintiff's injury and the length of time between his examinations and the production of the amended affidavit conclusively demonstrate that the proof was not "clear and unambiguous." Id. Our careful review of the record failed to disclose conclusive evidence that plaintiff's alleged injuries were caused by defendant's assault and battery and that such alleged injury was permanent. Indeed, the trial justice stated that "the disability that she [plaintiff] suffers under is per the medical opinion permanent, or at least was at the time of the opinion." The trial justice's apparent doubt as to whether the injury was permanent at the time of trial illustrated further plaintiff's failure to present sufficient medical evidence under this simplified manner of proof. See Parrillo, 518 A.2d at 356. We therefore conclude that the medical evidence presented by plaintiff was incompetent to establish that the assault and battery by defendant was the proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injury.41
The defendant next argued that the trial justice's award of compensatory damages in the amount of $60,346 was grossly excessive. We agree.44
The trial justice based the award of compensatory damages in part on the pain and suffering alleged by plaintiff, whom the trial justice found credible and candid. The trial justice found that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses presented by plaintiff were "not significant in [the] Court's  mind." Such a conclusion, however, ignored the contradictions between the witnesses' testimony and the internal inconsistencies of plaintiff's own testimony. Indeed, our review of the record revealed that plaintiff's testimony was remarkably malleable. The plaintiff transformed a slight touching (as it was characterized by all witnesses except plaintiff) into a major assault and battery.45
In addition to the inconsistencies in plaintiff's testimony concerning the event, plaintiff's testimony in respect to her pain and suffering was not credible, given her medical disabilities that predated the alleged additional injury that she claimed to have sustained as a result of the assault and battery. The trial justice was clearly wrong in relying on plaintiff's testimony concerning her pain and suffering absent additional evidence to establish the specific pain and suffering that developed from this contact with defendant.46
This court will not disturb an award for pain and suffering unless the award " 'shocks the conscience' or is grossly excessive." Proffitt, 463 A.2d at 519 (citing Bruno v. Caianiello, 121 R.I. 913, 917, 404 A.2d 62, 65 (1979)). Given the absence of competent medical evidence of causation and given that plaintiff's testimony concerning the assault and her subsequent injuries was not credible, the award of $60,346 in compensatory damages was clearly excessive and out of all proportion to the alleged injury. Consequently, we vacate the award.47
The defendant also argued that punitive damages should not have been awarded because the trial justice did not find that defendant acted with malice or in bad faith as directed by Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314, 318 (R.I.1993). Disfavored in the law, an award of punitive damages is an extraordinary sanction permitted only with great caution and within narrow limits. Id. In the instant case there was no proof of malice or bad faith nor was there a finding that defendant acted with malice. Consequently, the award of punitive damages in this case was not consistent with the purpose of such damages, namely, the deterrence of a defendant's "willfulness, recklessness or wickedness," because evidence of these factors was not presented. Id. (quoting Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 109, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974)).49
In conclusion, we deny in part and sustain in part the defendant's appeal. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in respect to the defendant's commission of assault and battery, but we vacate the awards of compensatory and punitive damages. We remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial on the damages sustained by the plaintiff.50
 After plaintiff rested, Barry Pontiac moved to dismiss the suit against it pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice granted the motion, and therefore, Barry Pontiac is not a party to this appeal.51
 In a statement describing the incident to the Newport Police, plaintiff stated, "HE GRABBED MY COAT[.] I LUNGED BACKWARD HURTING MY BACK[.]" In a Social Security Administration "Reconsideration Disability Report" dated March 20, 1987, plaintiff stated that she had been "attack [sic] by a merchanic [sic] from Barry Pontiac" and that she had been "[t]hrown against a wall at Kents [sic] garage [.]" The plaintiff testified at trial that, notwithstanding the Disability Report, she had not been thrown against a wall.52
 The affidavit was admitted under G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-19-27, which states in pertinent part:53
"(a) [I]n any proceeding commenced in any court * * *, an itemized bill and reports, including hospital medical records, relating to medical * * * services * * * and/or any report of any examination of said injured person, including, but not limited to, hospital medical records subscribed and sworn to * * * by the physician * * * shall be admissible as evidence of * * * the necessity of such services or treatment, the diagnosis of said physician * * *, the prognosis of such physician * * * the opinion of such physician * * * as to proximate cause of the condition so diagnosed, the opinion of such physician * * * as to disability or incapacity, if any, proximately resulting from the condition so diagnosed * * *."
 Counsel for Barry Pontiac reported at trial that Kenney had retired six years earlier and had sent his medical records to "dead files."55
 The following exchanges between plaintiff and defense counsel illustrate the nature of plaintiff's testimony:56
"Q So it's possible that you told Dr. Kenney that you were shaken by the assailant?
"A Well, I was shaken, but maybe not in the terms--but I was shook up. That's it. You know what I mean. I was shook up mentally. I was ascared [sic]."
"Q Are you claiming that he [Silvia] physically picked you up and swung you around?
"A Well, my feet wasn't hitting the floor. * * *.
"Q So in addition to Mr. Silvia grabbing you by the shoulders he physically lifted you off the ground, is that correct?
"A I can't say for sure because I felt dizzy. The room was spinning. So I felt like I was off the floor, but I don't know because I was just moving around fast."
Should defendants be liable if they knowingly expose the plaintiff to a near certainty of harmful contact? If so, should liability still be assigned even if the defendant did not act for the purpose of hurting the plaintiff?
[46 Wn.2d 198] [279 P.2d 1092] Kennett, McCutcheon & Soderland, Seattle, James P. Healy, Tacoma, for appellant.8
Frederick J. Orth, Rode, Cook, Watkins & Orth, Seattle, for respondent.9
The liability of an infant for an alleged battery is presented to this court for the first time. Brian [46 Wn.2d 199] Dailey (age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, likewise an adult, in the back yard of the plaintiff's home, on July 16, 1951. It is plaintiff's contention that she came out into the back yard to talk with Naomi and that, as she started to sit down in a wood and canvas lawn chair, Brian deliberately pulled it out from under her. The only one of the three persons present so testifying was Naomi Garratt. (Ruth Garratt, the plaintiff, did not testify as to how or why she fell.) The trial court, unwilling to accept this testimony, adopted instead Brian Dailey's version of what happened, and made the following findings:11
'III. * * * that while Naomi Garratt and Brian Dailey were in the back yard the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, came out of her house into the back yard. Some time subsequent thereto defendant, Brian Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn chair which was then and there located in the back yard of the above described premises, moved it sideways a few feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, about to sit down at the place where the lawn chair had formerly been, at which time he hurriedly got up from the chair and attempted to move it toward Ruth Garratt to aid her in sitting down in the chair; that due to the defendant's small size and lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the plaintiff in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That plaintiff fell to the ground and sustained a fracture of her hip, and other injuries and damages as hereinafter set forth.
'IV. That the preponderance of the evidence in this case establishes that when the defendant, Brian Dailey, moved the chair in question he did not have any wilful or unlawful purpose in doing so; that he did not have any intent to injure the plaintiff, or any intent to bring about any unauthorized or offensive contact with her person or any objects appurtenant thereto; that the circumstances which immediately preceded the fall of the plaintiff established that the defendant, Brian Dailey, did not have purpose, intent or design to perform a prank or to effect an assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff.' (Italics ours, for a purpose hereinafter indicated.)
It is conceded that Ruth Garratt's fall resulted in a fractured hip and other painful and serious injuries. To obviate [46 Wn.2d 200] the necessity of a retrial in the event this court determines that she was entitled to a judgment against Brian Dailey, the amount of [279 P.2d 1093] her damage was found to be $11,000. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the action and asks for the entry of a judgment in that amount or a new trial.13
The authorities generally, but with certain notable exceptions, see Bohlen, 'Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons,' 23 Mich.L.Rev. 9, state that when a minor has committed a tort with force he is liable to be proceeded against as any other person would be. Paul v. Hummel, 1868, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am.Dec. 381; Huchting v. Engel, 1863, 17 Wis. 230, 84 Am.Dec. 741; Briese v. Maechtle, 1911, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 574; 1 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 194, § 66; Prosser on Torts 1085, § 108; 2 Kent's Commentaries 241; 27 Am.Jur. 812, Infants, § 90.14
In our analysis of the applicable law, we start with the basis premise that Brian, whether five or fifty-five, must have committed some wrongful act before he could be liable for appellant's injuries.15
The trial court's finding that Brian was a visitor in the Garratt back yard is supported by the evidence and negatives appellant's assertion that Brian was a trespasser and had no right to touch, move, or sit in any chair in that yard, and that contention will not receive further consideration.16
It is urged that Brian's action in moving the chair constituted a battery. A definition (not all-inclusive but sufficient for out purpose) of a battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon another. The rule that determines liability for battery is given in 1 Restatement, Torts, 29, § 13, as:17
'An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person makes the actor liable to the other, if
'(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and
'(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the [46 Wn.2d 201] other's consent thereto is procured by fraud or duress, and
'(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged.'
We have in this case no question of consent or privilege. We therefore proceed to an immediate consideration of intent and its place in the law of battery. In the comment on clause (a), the Restatement says:19
'Character of actor's intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.' See, also, Prosser on Torts 41, § 8.
We have here the conceded volitional act of Brian, i. e., the moving of a chair. Had the plaintiff proved to the satisfaction of the trial court that Brian moved the chair while she was in the act of sitting down, Brian's action would patently have been for the purpose or with the intent of causing the plaintiff's bodily contact with the ground, and she would be entitled to a judgment against him for the resulting damages. Vosburg v. Putney, 1891, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403, 14 L.R.A. 226; Briese v. Maechtle, supra.21
The plaintiff based her case on that theory, and the trial court held that she failed in her proof and accepted Brian's version of the facts rather than that given by the eyewitness who testified for the plaintiff. After the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not established her theory of a battery (i. e., that Brian had pulled the chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of sitting down), it then became concerned with whether a battery was established under the facts as it found them to be.22
In this connection, we quote another portion of the comment on the 'Character of actor's intention,' relating to clause (a) of the rule from the Restatement heretofore set forth:23
'It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even [279 P.2d 1094] though the actor realizes or should realize [46 Wn.2d 202] that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact or apprehension. Such realization may make the actor's conduct negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not that intention which is necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this section.'
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court found, in the italicized portions of the findings of fact quoted above, that he did not have, he would of course have had the knowledge to which we have referred. The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Mercer v. Corbin, 1889, 117 Ind. 450, 20 N.E. 132, 3 L.R.A. 221. Without such knowledge, there would be nothing wrongful about Brian's act in moving the chair and, there being no wrongful act, there would be no liability.25
While a finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made, we believe that before the plaintiff's action in such a case should be dismissed there should be no question but that the trial court had passed upon that issue; hence, the case should be remanded for clarification of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian's knowledge, because intent could be inferred therefrom. If the court finds that he had such knowledge the necessary intent will be established and the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, even though there was no purpose to injure or embarrass the plaintiff. Vosburg v. Putney, supra. If Brian did not have such knowledge, there was no wrongful act by him and the basic premise of liability on the theory of a battery was not established.26
It will be noted that the law of battery as we have [46 Wn.2d 203] discussed it is the law applicable to adults, and no significance has been attached to the fact that Brian was a child less than six years of age when the alleged battery occurred. The only circumstance where Brian's age is of any consequence is in determining what he knew, and there his experience, capacity, and understanding are of course material.27
From what has been said, it is clear that we find no merit in plaintiff's contention that we can direct the entry of a judgment for $11,000 in her favor on the record now before us.28
Nor do we find any error in the record that warrants a new trial.29
What we have said concerning intent in relation to batteries caused by the physical contact of a plaintiff with the ground or floor as the result of the removal of a chair by a defendant furnishes the basis for the answer to the contention of the plaintiff that the trial court changed its theory of the applicable law after the trial, and that she was prejudiced thereby.30
It is clear to us that there was no change in theory so far as the plaintiff's case was concerned. The trial court consistently from beginning to end recognized that if the plaintiff proved what she alleged and her eyewitness testified, namely, that Brian pulled the chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of sitting down and she fell to the ground in consequence thereof, a battery was established. Had she proved that state of facts, then the trial court's comments about inability to find any intent (from the connotation of motivation) to injure or embarrass the plaintiff, and the italicized portions of his findings as above set forth could have indicated a change of theory. But what must be recognized is that the trial court was trying in those comments and in the italicized findings to express the law applicable, not to the facts as the plaintiff contended they were, but to the facts as the trial court found them to be. The remand for clarification gives the plaintiff an opportunity to secure a judgment even though the trial court did not accept her version of the facts, if from all [279 P.2d 1095] the evidence, the trial court can find that Brian knew with substantial [46 Wn.2d 204] certainty that the plaintiff intended to sit down where the chair had been before he moved it, and still without reference to motivation.31
The plaintiff-appellant urges as another ground for a new trial that she was refused the right to cross-examine Brian. Some twenty pages of cross-examination indicate that there was no refusal of the right of cross-examination. The only occasion that impressed us as being a restriction on the right of cross-examination occurred when plaintiff was attempting to develop the fact that Brian had had chairs pulled out from under him at kindergarten and had complained about it. Plaintiff's counsel sought to do this by asking questions concerning statements made at Brian's home and in a court reporter's office. When objections were sustained, counsel for plaintiff stated that he was asking about the conversations to refresh the recollection of the child, and made an offer of proof. The fact that plaintiff was seeking to develop came into the record by the very simple method of asking Brian what had happened at kindergarten. Consequently what plaintiff offered to prove by the cross-examination is in the record, and the restriction imposed by the trial court was not prejudicial.32
It is argued that some courts predicate an infant's liability for tort upon the basis of the existence of an estate in the infant; hence it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit as an exhibit a policy of liability insurance as evidence that there was a source from which a judgment might be satisfied. In our opinion the liability of an infant for his tort does not depend upon the size of his estate or even upon the existence of one. That is a matter of concern only to the plaintiff who seeks to enforce a judgment against the infant.33
The motion for a new trial was also based on newly discovered evidence. The case having been tried to the court, the trial judge was certainly in a position to know whether that evidence would change the result on a new trial. It was not of a character that would make the denial of the motion an abuse of discretion.34
[46 Wn.2d 205] The plaintiff complains, and with some justice, that she was not permitted to take a pretrial deposition of the defendant Brian Dailey. While Rule of Pleading, Practice, and Procedure 30(b), 34A Wash.2d 91, gives the trial court the right 'for good cause shown' to prevent the taking of a deposition, it seems to us that though it might well have been taken under the supervision of the court to protect the child from leading, misleading and confusing questions, the deposition should have been allowed, if the child was to be permitted to testify at the trial. If, however, the refusal to allow the taking of the deposition was an abuse of discretion, and that we are not prepared to hold, it has not been established that the refusal constituted prejudicial error. (Parenthetically we would add that the right to a review of the rulings on pretrial procedure or with respect to depositions or discovery or incidental procedural motions preceding the trial seems to be limited to an appeal from a final judgment, 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Rules Ed.) § 803; 3 Id. § 1552, and realistically such a review is illusory for the reasons given by Prof. David W. Louisell. See 36 Minn.L.Rev. 654.)35
The cause is remanded for clarification, with instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Brian Dailey knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair which he moved had been, and to change the judgment if the findings warrant it.36
Costs on this appeal will abide the ultimate decision of the superior court. If a judgment is entered for the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, appellant here, she shall be entitled to her costs on this appeal. If, however, the judgment of dismissal remains unchanged, the respondent will be entitled to recover his costs on this appeal.37
Remanded for clarification.38
SCHWELLENBACH, DONWORTH, and WEAVER, JJ., concur.
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.
(2) An action which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for an apprehension caused thereby although the act involves an unreasonable risk of causing it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to liability for that harm.
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other's person although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
In the absence of statutes that clearly delineate acceptable from unacceptable behavior – that’s the realm of criminal law, and still plenty complicated – tort law often requires a court to draw boundaries on the fly as individual cases come up. Here we look at a cluster of problems arising generally from situations in which society might say the wrongness of an act may be minimal or entirely lacking – yet a victim steps forward to earnestly claim that his or her wishes about bodily integrity have been disrespected.
The rough and tumble of daily life – “the implied license of the playground” – allows some license for those who offend with physical contact, including against the especially sensitive. When does that license end, particularly if a plaintiff’s special sensitivities are known to a defendant? Are there any larger principles at work to help us resolve conflicts in this zone, or that at least capture the instincts that might find themselves in opposition?
Should findings of offensive-contact-battery be based on a plaintiff’s level of sensitivity, or a more general standard?
Court of Appeals of North Dakota.
Martin Wishnatsky, Fargo, pro se.8
Andrew Moraghan, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Bismarck, for defendant and appellee.9
Martin Wishnatsky appealed a summary judgment dismissing his battery action against David W. Huey, and an order denying his motion for an altered judgment. We conclude, as a matter of law, that no battery occurred, and we affirm the judgment and the order.11
On January 10, 1996, Huey, an assistant attorney general, was engaged in a conversation with attorney Peter B. Crary in Crary's office. Without knocking or announcing his entry, Wishnatsky, who performs paralegal work for Crary, attempted to enter the office. Huey pushed the door closed, thereby pushing Wishnatsky back into the hall. Wishnatsky reentered the office and Huey left.12
Wishnatsky brought an action against Huey, seeking damages for battery. Huey moved for summary judgment of dismissal. The trial court granted Huey's motion and a judgment of dismissal was entered. Wishnatsky moved to alter the judgment. The trial court denied Wishnatsky's motion.13
Wishnatsky appealed, contending the evidence he submitted in response to Huey's motion for summary judgment satisfies the elements of a battery claim and the trial court erred in granting Huey's motion. Wishnatsky also contends Huey is not entitled to prosecutorial or statutory immunity.14
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes would not alter the result. Perry Center, Inc. v. Heitkamp, 1998 ND 78, ¶ 12, 576 N.W.2d 505. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably can be drawn from the evidence." Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 1998 ND 118, ¶ 12, 579 N.W.2d 583. "Disputes of fact become questions of law if reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion from the evidence." Id. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if the trial court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. Tuhy v. Schlabsz, 1998 ND 31, ¶ 5, 574 N.W.2d 823. On a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the question for the court is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).15
"In its original conception [battery] meant the infliction of physical injury." VIII Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 422 (2d Impression 1973). By the Eighteenth Century, the requirement of an actual physical injury had been eliminated:16
At Nisi Prius, upon evidence in trespass for assault and battery, Holt, C.J. declared,
1. That the least touching of another in anger is a battery. 2. If two or more meet in a narrow passage, and without any violence or design of harm, the one touches the other gently, it is no battery. 3. If any of them use violence against the other, to force his way in a rude inordinate manner, it is a battery; or any struggle about the passage, to that degree as may do hurt, is a battery. Vid.Bro.Tresp. 236. 7 E. 4, 26. 22 Ass. 60. 3 H. 4, 9.
Cole v. Turner, Pasch. 3 Ann., 6 Mod. 149, 90 Eng.Rep. 958 (1704). Blackstone explained:19
The least touching of another's person willfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between different degrees  of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it: every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner.
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *120. On the other hand, "in a crowded world, a certain amount of personal contact is inevitable, and must be accepted." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 9, at 42 (5th ed.1984).21
The American Law Institute has balanced the interest in unwanted contacts and the inevitable contacts in a crowded world in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 18, 19 (1965):22
18. Battery: Offensive Contact
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1,a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other's person although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
19. What Constitutes Offensive Contact
A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.
Comment c to § 18 notes that the contact need not be "directly caused by some act of the actor" and also notes that "the essence of the plaintiff's grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body." Comment a to § 19 explains what kind of conduct offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity:31
In order that a contact be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, it must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.
Huey moved for summary judgment of dismissal, because, among other things, "as a matter of law, a battery did not occur on January 10, 1996." Huey supported the motion with his affidavit stating in part:33
8. That Attorney Crary and I had settled into a serious discussion about the case and had established a good rapport when the door to his office suddenly swung open without a knock. An unidentified individual carrying some papers then strode in unannounced. I had not been told that anyone would be entering Attorney Crary's office during the private meeting.... I subsequently learned that the individual's name is Martin Wishnatsky.
Wishnatsky responded to Huey's motion for summary judgment with an affidavit of Crary and with his own affidavit stating in part:35
1. I am a born-again Christian and cultivate holiness in my life. [A]s a result I am very sensitive to evil spirits and am greatly disturbed by the demonic. However, in Christ there is victory.
2. On January 9, 1996, Mr. David Huey of the North Dakota Attorney General's office, visited the ministry where I was working at 16 Broadway in Fargo, North Dakota with an ex parte court order.
3. The following morning I entered the office of Peter Crary, an attorney for whom I do paralegal work, to give him certain papers that had been requested. Mr. Crary was speaking with Mr. David Huey at the time. As I began to enter the office Mr Huey threw his body weight against the door and forced me out into the hall. I had not said a word to him. At the same time, he snarled: "You get out of here." This was very shocking and frightening to me. In all the time I have been working as an aide to Mr. Crary, I have never been physically assaulted or spoken to in a harsh and brutal manner. My blood pressure began to rise, my heart beat accelerated and I felt waves of fear in the pit of my stomach. My hands began to shake and my body to tremble. Composing myself, I reentered the office, whereupon  Mr. Huey began a half-demented tirade against me and stormed out into the hall. I looked at Mr. Crary in wonder.
We certainly agree with the Supreme Court's determination that when Wishnatsky attempted to enter the room in which Huey was conversing with Crary, "Huey apparently reacted in a rude and abrupt manner in attempting to exclude Wishnatsky from that conversation." Wishnatsky v. Huey, 1997 ND 35, ¶ 15, 560 N.W.2d 878. As a matter of law, however, Huey's "rude and abrupt" conduct did not rise to the level of battery.39
The evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates Wishnatsky is "unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 cmt. a (1965). Without knocking or otherwise announcing his intentions, Wishnatsky opened the door to the office in which Huey and Crary were having a private conversation and attempted to enter. Huey closed the door opened by Wishnatsky, thereby stopping Wishnatsky's forward progress and pushing him back into the hall. The bodily contact was momentary, indirect, and incidental. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wishnatsky, and giving him the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we conclude Huey's conduct in response to Wishnatsky's intrusion into his private conversation with Crary, while "rude and abrupt," would not "be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity." In short, an "ordinary person ... not unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity" intruding upon a private conversation in Wishnatsky's manner would not have been offended by Huey's response to the intrusion. We conclude that Huey's conduct did not constitute an offensive-contact-battery, as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in granting Huey's motion for summary judgment dismissing Wishnatsky's action.40
Because we have concluded there was no battery as a matter of law, we need not address the immunity issues Wishnatsky has raised. We need not consider questions, the answers to which are unnecessary to the determination of the case. See, e.g., Kaler v. Kraemer, 1998 ND 56, ¶ 10, 574 N.W.2d 588; Hospital Servs., Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D.1975).41
HOBERG, C.J., WILLIAM F. HODNY, Surrogate Judge, and DEBBIE G. KLEVEN, District Judge, concur.43
 Wishnatsky also sought a disorderly conduct restraining order under N.D.C.C. Ch. 12.1-31.2 against Huey, based on the January 10, 1996, incident, and another on January 25, 1996. In affirming a judgment dismissing Wishnatsky's petition, our Supreme Court concluded "Huey's conduct did not rise to the level of intrusive behavior which would warrant a reasonable person to conclude Huey committed the offense of disorderly conduct." Wishnatsky v. Huey, 1997 ND 35, ¶ 15, 560 N.W.2d 878.
Plaintiff for his complaint, states and alleges as follows:
1. He is a resident of Cass County, North Dakota.
2. Defendant David W. Huey is an assistant attorney general for the state of North Dakota and a resident of Bismarck. Defendant is being sued in both his individual and official capacities.Jurisdiction
3. This action arises under the common law of torts.
4. Plaintiff has his office on the third floor of 16 Broadway in Fargo and provides paralegal services to attorney Peter Crary whose office is on the same floor. It is very common and a matter of routine for the plaintiff to be in and out of Mr. Crary's office during the day.
5. On Wednesday morning, January 10th, 1996, at approximately 10:00 a.m. during normal business hours the plaintiff entered Mr. Crary's office to give him certain papers that had been requested. Mr. Crary was speaking with defendant David Huey at the time. As the plaintiff began to enter the office, Mr. Huey snarled: "You get out of here." Simultaneously the defendant threw his body weight against the door to prevent the plaintiff from entering Mr. Crary's office. The pressure of the door being forced against his body by Mr. Huey overcame plaintiff’s forward movement and he was physically forced backwards and out into the hall.
6. The plaintiff had not said a word to Mr. Huey to provoke this attack. He had done nothing more than to open the door and to begin to walk into Mr. Crary's office, something he routinely did many times every work day.
7. The plaintiff was shocked and frightened by Mr. Huey's physical attack upon him. In all the time he had been providing paralegal services to Mr. Crary, he had never been physically assaulted or spoken to in a harsh and brutal manner. Plaintiff’s blood pressure began to rise. His heartbeat accelerated and he experienced waves of fear in the pit of his stomach. Plaintiff’s hands also began to shake and his body trembled.
8. Composing himself, the plaintiff reentered Mr. Crary's office to deliver the papers to him and made a brief and respectful statement to Mr. Huey that as a public servant he had an obligation to treat the public with respect and courtesy. Mr. Huey then went into a tirade, stating that he would no longer discuss anything with Mr. Crary, that his time was too valuable, etc. He then stormed out into the hall. The plaintiff then gave Mr. Crary the papers he had originally entered his office to provide and left.
9. After this experience it took the plaintiff a considerable amount of time to settle down and get into his work routine. He was emotionally upset and frightened by the abusive behavior of the state's representative.
10. By the actions described in paragraphs 5-8, the defendant intentionally and in anger engaged in violent, offensive, insulting, uninvited and unwanted physical contact with the plaintiff.
11. This unpermitted contact, as described above, was reasonably offensive to the plaintiffs sense of personal dignity, was unwarranted by the social usages prevalent in an office environment and in the legal community, and was contrary to all good manners.
12. This offensive contact constituted a battery upon the person of the plaintiff.
13. Defendant's actions constitute malfeasance in that the battery was a wholly wrongful and unlawful act.
14. Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages for the battery itself and compensatory damages for the emotional upset, fear and distress caused by the defendants' actions.
15. Plaintiff requests a trial by jury and such other and further relief as the court may deem suitable.
Mr. Andrew Moraghan
Assistant Attorney General
900 East Boulevard
Bismarck ND 58505
RE: Wishnatsky v. Huey
Civil No. 96-2297
Dear Mr. Moraghan:
Enclosed is a draft motion to compel in the above matter. In the interest of allowing the defendant to reconsider his discovery responses, the motion is being sent to you for consideration.
I will allow you a week or two to consider the motion before filing it. If you need more time or decide voluntarily to supplement the responses served on January 29, 1997, please let me know.
Mr. Martin Wishnatsky
P.O. Box 413 Fargo, ND 58107
RE: Wishnatsky v. Huey Civil
Dear Mr. Wishnatsky:
Thank you for your letter dated May 13, 1997.
We believe that there were valid grounds for the objections that we interposed to your interrogatories. Therefore, we will not be amending our answers.
We do not believe that your proposed motion to compel discovery would be substantially justified. Furthermore, we believe that the interrogatories to which we objected were designed to harass the defendant. Therefore, if you elect to file your motion, it is likely that we will seek reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing the motion.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. Thank you.
General Office of Attorney General
900 East Boulevard Avenue
Bismarck, ND 58505-0041
Telephone (701) 328-3640
Facsimile (701) 328-4300
cc: Dave Huey
Peter B. Crary, being duly sworn, deposes and says:4
1. I am a member of the North Dakota Bar Association. My law office is at 1201 12th Avenue North in Fargo. My legal assistant is Martin Wishnatsky.5
2. In January of 1996, my offices were on the third floor of the old Herbst Building at 16 Broadway in downtown Fargo. Mr. Wishnatsky occupied an office across the hall from me. The offices had full-length glass-paneled windows and doors.6
3. On the morning of Wednesday, January 10, 1996 I was having a conversation in my office with North Dakota Assistant Attorney General David Huey, when Mr. Wishnatsky opened the door and walked in. Martin was carrying certain papers which were pertinent to my discussion with Mr. Huey and was entering the room to deliver them to me as part of his duties as my legal assistant. It is quite common for Martin to be in and out of my office during the day. There was nothing unusual in his entering my office at this time.7
4. Mr. Huey had been conducting himself in an orderly manner during our conversation. However, when Mr. Wishnatsky began to enter my office, he seemed to undergo a personality change and went into an emotional "spike." He snarled at Mr. Wishnatsky to get out of the room and then, as it appeared to me, physically forced Martin out into the hall by thrusting his body weight against the door. I believe he also made physical contact with Martin's body as well as the door. I was quite startled at this behavior because (1) it seemed to be a sudden personality change on Mr. Huey's part and (2) it seemed as if, prior to this change in behavior, we were having what I would characterize as an amicable exchange in my office.8
Frankly, I simply had no prior experience of a visitor to my office at 16 Broadway or in any other location becoming physically aggressive and hostile until I witnessed this behavior by Mr. Huey. Mr. Huey's actions were completely unprovoked by Mr. Wishnatsky who had not previously said a word to him.9
5. Mr. Wishnatsky reentered my office to deliver the papers to me and made a brief and respectful statement to Mr. Huey that as a public servant he had an obligation to treat the public with respect and courtesy. Mr. Huey then went into an irrational tirade, stating that he would no longer discuss anything with me, that his time was too valuable, etc., and stormed out into the hall. Mr. Wishnatsky called after him, "David," attempting, it seemed to me, to calm him down. Mr. Wishnatsky gave me the papers he had originally entered my office to provide. He then left. Mr. Huey re-entered the office and we resumed our conversation.10
6. Certainly Mr. Huey's "spike" was unusual and not in keeping with the geniality that is becoming a businessman/lawyer/public servant. Furthermore, over my years of serving the public, I have never witnessed such an abrupt ("spike") change of personality!11
7. Obviously I regard this as a very serious matter and certainly remain available should I be called upon further to elaborate on this event.12
8. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A are enlargements of photos taken subsequent to the events described above which depict a re-enactment of Mr. Wishnatsky entering my office at 16 Broadway. The photos show the glass paneled-door and windows. The chair Mr. Huey was sitting in is depicted in the location it occupied at the time of the incident.13
9. Any visitor to my office was visible through the glass in the door before entering. My desk was positioned facing the door.15
Peter B. Crary:
Should we expect actors to respect the inner wishes of others, even when those desires contradict—or at least fail to be reflected in—external behavior?
Suffolk. January 19, 1891. — September 1, 1891.5
Present: FIELD, C. J., ALLEN, HOLMES, KNOWLTON, & MORTON, JJ.6
Carrier by Sea — Surgeon — Assault — Negligent Vaccination.7
If the surgeon of a foreign steamship, bringing immigrants to a port of this country where the quarantine regulations require vaccination as a prerequisite to landing, vaccinates one of them whose behavior indicates consent on her part, whatever her unexpressed feelings may be, he is justified in his act, and the ship-owner is not liable therefor as for an assault.8
A ship-owner who provides a competent surgeon, whom the passengers may employ if they choose, is not liable for his negligence in the medical treatment of a passenger, either at common law or by the TJ. S. St. of August 2, 1882, § 5, which requires every vessel transporting immigrant passengers to carry a surgeon or  medical practitioner, "who shall be rated as such in the ship's articles, and who shall be provided with surgical instruments, medical comforts, and medicines," and makes the master of the vessel liable to a penalty for its violation. In an action against a steamship company for assault by a ship's surgeon in vaccinating a steerage passenger brought toa port in this State, evidence consisting of the printed quarantine regulations of the port, to the effect that only such steerage passengers as held certificates from such surgeon that they had been vaccinated would be allowed to land without detention or vaccination, and of testimony that such regulations were carried out, was heldto be properly admitted.9
TORT, for an assault, and for negligently vaccinating the plaintiff, a steerage passenger on the steamship Catalonia. Trial in the Superior Court, before Staples, J., who ruled that, upon the evidence, the plaintiff could not maintain the action, and ordered a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. The nature of the evidence appears in the opinion.10
E. N. Hill & F. Cunningham, for the plaintiff.11
G. Putnam, (T. Russell with him,) for the defendant.12
This case presents two questions: first, whether there was any evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant, by any of its servants or agents, committed an assault on the plaintiff; secondly, whether there was evidence on which the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty of negligence towards the plaintiff. To sustain the first count, which was for an alleged assault, the plaintiff relied on the fact that the surgeon who was employed by the defendant vaccinated her on shipboard, while she was on her passage from Queenstown to Boston. On this branch of the case the question is whether there was any evidence that the surgeon used force upon the plaintiff against her will. In determining whether the act was lawful or unlawful, the surgeon's conduct must be considered in connection with the circumstances. If the plaintiff's behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part, he was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been. In determining whether she consented, he could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings. Ford v. Ford, 143 Mass. 577, 578. McCarthy v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 148 Mass. 550, 552. It is undisputed that at Boston there are strict quarantine regulations in regard to the examination of immigrants, to see that they are protected from small-pox by vaccination, and that only those  persons who hold a certificate from the medical officer of the steamship, stating that they are so protected, are permitted to land without detention in quarantine or vaccination by the port physician. It appears that the defendant is accustomed to have its surgeons vaccinate all immigrants who desire it, and who are not protected by previous vaccination, and give them a certificate which is accepted at quarantine as evidence of their protection. Notices of the regulations at quarantine, and of the willingness of the ship's medical officer to vaccinate such as needed vaccination, were posted about the ship, in various languages, and on the day when the operation was performed the surgeon had a right to presume that she and the other women who were vaccinated understood the importance and purpose of vaccination for those who bore no marks to show that they were protected. By the plaintiff's testimony, which in this particular is undisputed, it appears that about two hundred women passengers were assembled below, and she understood from conversation with them that they were to be vaccinated; that she stood about fifteen feet from the surgeon, and saw them form in a line and pass in turn before him; that he "examined their arms, and, passing some of them by, proceeded to vaccinate those that had no mark"; that she did not hear him say anything to any of them; that upon being passed by they each received a card and went on deck; that when her turn came she showed him her arm, and he looked at it and said there was no mark, and that she should be vaccinated; that she told him she had been vaccinated before and it left no mark; "that he then said nothing, that he should vaccinate her again"; that she held up her arm to be vaccinated; that no one touched her; that she did not tell him that she did not want to be vaccinated; and that she took the ticket which he gave her certifying that he had vaccinated her, and used it at quarantine. She was one of a large number of women who were vaccinated on that occasion, without, so far as appears, a word of objection from any of them. They all indicated by their conduct that they desired to avail themselves of the provisions made for their benefit. There was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff to indicate to the surgeon that she did not wish to obtain a card which would save her from detention at quarantine, and to be vaccinated, if necessary, for that  purpose. Viewing his conduct in the light of the circumstances, it was lawful; and there was no evidence tending to show that it was not. The ruling of the court on this part of the case was correct.14
The plaintiff contends that, if it was lawful for the surgeon to vaccinate her, the vaccination, as alleged in the second count, was negligently performed. "There was no evidence of want of care or precaution by the defendant in the selection of the surgeon, or in the procuring of the virus or vaccine matter." Unless there was evidence that the surgeon was negligent in performing the operation, and unless the defendant is liable for this negligence, the plaintiff must fail on the second count. Whether there was any evidence of negligence of the surgeon, we need not inquire, for we are of opinion that the defendant is not liable for his want of care in performing surgical operations. The only ground on which it is argued that the defendant is liable for his negligence is, that he is a servant engaged in the defendant's business, and subject to its control. We think this argument is founded on a mistaken construction of the duty imposed on the defendant by law. By the act of Congress of August 2, 1882, § 5, it is provided that "every steamship or other vessel carrying or bringing emigrant passengers, or passengers other than cabin passengers, exceeding fifty in number, shall carry a duly qualified and competent surgeon or medical practitioner, who shall be rated as such in the ship's articles, and who shall be provided with surgical instruments, medical comforts, and medicines proper and necessary for diseases and accidents incident to sea voyages, and for the proper medical treatment of such passengers during the voyage, and with such articles of food and nourishment as may be proper and necessary for preserving the health of infants and young children; and the services of such surgeon or medical practitioner shall be promptly given, in any case of sickness or disease, to any of the passengers, or to any infant or young child of any such passengers, who may need his services. For a violation of either of the provisions of this section the master of the vessel shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars."15
Under this statute it is the duty of ship-owners to provide a competent surgeon, whom the passengers may employ if they  choose, in the business of healing their wounds and curing their diseases. The law does not put the business of treating sick passengers into the charge of common carriers, and make them responsible for the proper management of it. The work which the physician or surgeon does in such cases is under the control of the passengers themselves. It is their business, not the business of the carrier. They may employ the ship's surgeon, or some other physician or surgeon who happens to be on board, or they may treat themselves, if they are sick, or may go without treatment if they prefer; and if they employ the surgeon, they may determine how far they will submit themselves to his directions, and what of his medicines they will take and what reject, and whether they will submit to a surgical operation or take the risk of going without it. The master or owners of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical officer when he attends a passenger. He is not their servant, engaged in their business and subject to their control as to his mode of treatment. They do their whole duty if they employ a duly qualified and competent surgeon and medical practitioner, and supply him with all necessary and proper instruments, medicines, and medical comforts, and have him in readiness for such passengers as choose to employ him. This is the whole requirement of the statute of the United States applicable to such cases, and if, by the nature of their undertaking to transport passengers by sea, they are under a liability at the common law to make provision for their passengers in this respect, that liability is no greater. It is quite reasonable that the owners of a steamship used in the transportation of passengers should be required by law to provide a competent person to whom sick passengers can apply for medical treatment, and when they have supplied such a person, it would be unreasonable to hold them responsible for all the particulars of his treatment, when he is engaged in the business of other persons in regard to which they are powerless to interfere.16
The reasons on which it is held, in the courts of the United States and of Massachusetts, that the owners are liable for the negligence of a pilot in navigating the ship, even though he is appointed by public agencies, and the master has no voice in the selection of him, do not apply to this case. The China, 7 Wall. 53, 67. Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23. The pilot is en  gaged in the navigation of the ship, for which, on grounds of public policy, the owners should be held responsible. The business is theirs, and they have certain rights of control in regard to it. They may determine when and how it shall be undertaken, and the master may displace the pilot for certain causes. But in England it has been held that even in such cases the owners are not liable. Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. & S. 98. The Protector, 1 W. Robinson, 45. The Maria, 1 W. Robinson, 95.17
The view which we have taken of this branch of the case is fully sustained by a unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, in Laubheim v. De Koninglyke Stoomboot Co. 107 N.Y. 228. See also Secord v. St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba Railway, 18 Fed. Rep. 221; McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. We are of opinion that on both parts of the case the rulings at the trial were correct.18
The evidence which was excepted to, consisting of the printed quarantine regulations above referred to, and of testimony that only the steerage passengers holding a surgeon's certificate were allowed to land, all others being vaccinated by the port physician or detained at quarantine, was rightly admitted.19
VOL. 154. 18
Should a smoker's license to freely blow his smoke be limited by the sensitivity of non-smokers?
[634 N.E.2d 698] [92 Ohio App.3d 233] Kircher, Robinson, Cook, Newman & Welch and Robert B. Newman, Cincinnati, for appellant.8
Strauss & Troy and William K. Flynn, Cincinnati, for appellees WLW Jacor Communications, Inc. and William Cunningham.9
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley, Stanley M. Chesley and Paul M. DeMarco, Cincinnati, for appellee Andy Furman.10
The plaintiff-appellant, Ahron Leichtman, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his complaint against the defendants-appellees, WLW Jacor Communications ("WLW"), William Cunningham and Andy Furman, for battery, invasion of privacy, and a violation of Cincinnati Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083. In his single assignment of error, Leichtman contends that his complaint was sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, therefore, the trial court was in error when it granted the defendants' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. We agree in part.12
In his complaint, Leichtman claims to be "a nationally known" antismoking advocate. Leichtman alleges that, on the date of the Great American Smokeout, he was invited to appear on the WLW Bill Cunningham radio talk show to discuss the harmful effects of smoking and breathing secondary smoke. He also alleges that, while he was in the studio, Furman, another WLW talk-show host, lit a cigar and repeatedly blew smoke in Leichtman's face "for the purpose of causing physical discomfort, humiliation and distress."13
Under the rules of notice pleading, Civ.R. 8(A)(1) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." When construing a complaint for failure to state a claim, under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court assumes that the factual allegations on the face of the complaint are true. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus. For the court to grant a motion to dismiss, "it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery." Id. A court cannot dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail. Slife v. Kundtz Properties, Inc. (1974), 40 Ohio App.2d 179, 69 O.O.2d 178, 318 N.E.2d 557. Because it is so easy for the pleader to satisfy the standard of Civ.R. 8(A), few complaints are subject to dismissal. Id. at 182, 69 O.O.2d at 180, 318 N.E.2d at 560.14
Leichtman contends that Furman's intentional act constituted a battery. The Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), states:15
"An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
"(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other * * *, and
"(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results[; or]
[92 Ohio App.3d 235] "(c) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results." (Footnote added.)
[634 N.E.2d 699] In determining if a person is liable for a battery, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule that "[c]ontact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is offensive contact." Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 524 N.E.2d 166, 167. It has defined "offensive" to mean "disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to taste and sensibilities or affronting insultingness." State v. Phipps (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 271, 274, 12 O.O.3d 273, 275, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1131. Furthermore, tobacco smoke, as "particulate matter," has the physical properties capable of making contact. R.C. 3704.01(B) and 5709.20(A); Ohio Adm.Code 3745-17.17
As alleged in Leichtman's complaint, when Furman intentionally blew cigar smoke in Leichtman's face, under Ohio common law, he committed a battery. No matter how trivial the incident, a battery is actionable, even if damages are only one dollar. Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12, 1 O.O.2d 158, 139 N.E.2d 25, paragraph two of the syllabus. The rationale is explained by Roscoe Pound in his essay "Liability": "[I]n civilized society men must be able to assume that others will do them no intentional injury--that others will commit no intentioned aggressions upon them." Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 169.18
Other jurisdictions also have concluded that a person can commit a battery by intentionally directing tobacco smoke at another. Richardson v. Hennly (1993), 209 Ga.App. 868, 871, 434 S.E.2d 772, 774-775. We do not, however, adopt or lend credence to the theory of a "smoker's battery," which imposes liability if there is substantial certainty that exhaled smoke will predictably contact a nonsmoker. Ezra, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke (1990), 63 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1061, 1090. Also, whether the "substantial certainty" prong of [92 Ohio App.3d 236] intent from the Restatement of Torts translates to liability for secondary smoke via the intentional tort doctrine in employment cases as defined by the Supreme Court in Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraph one of the syllabus, need not be decided here because Leichtman's claim for battery is based exclusively on Furman's commission of a deliberate act. Finally, because Leichtman alleges that Furman deliberately blew smoke into his face, we find it unnecessary to address offensive contact from passive or secondary smoke under the "glass cage" defense of McCracken v. Sloan (1979), 40 N.C.App. 214, 217, 252 S.E.2d 250, 252, relied on by the defendants.19
Neither Cunningham nor WLW is entitled to judgment on the battery claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Concerning Cunningham, at common law, one who is present and encourages or incites commission of a battery by words can be equally liable as a principal. Bell v. Miller (1831), 5 Ohio 250; 6 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1978) 121-122, Assault, Section 20. Leichtman's complaint states, "At Defendant Cunningham's urging, Defendant Furman repeatedly blew cigar smoke in Plaintiff's face."20
With regard to WLW, an employer is not legally responsible for the intentional torts of its employees that do not facilitate or promote its business. Osborne v. Lyles (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 329-330, 587 N.E.2d 825, 828-829. However, whether an employer is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because its employee is acting within the scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact. Id. at 330, 587 N.E.2d at 825. Accordingly, Leichtman's claim for battery with the allegations against the three defendants in the second count of the complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).21
By contrast, the first and third counts of Leichtman's complaint do not state claims upon which relief can be granted. The trial court correctly granted the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion as to both counts. In his first count, Leichtman alleged a tortious invasion of his privacy. See, generally, Restatement, supra, at 376, Section 652B, as adopted by Sustin v. Fee (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 143, 145, 23 O.O.3d 182, 183-184, 431 N.E.2d 992, 993. A claim for invasion of privacy may involve any one of four distinct torts. Prosser, Privacy (1960), 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383. The tort that is relevant here requires some substantial intrusion into a plaintiff's solitude, seclusion, habitation, or affairs that would be highly [634 N.E.2d 700] offensive to a reasonable person. See, e.g., Restatement, supra, at 378-379, Section 652B, Comments a to d; Killilea v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 163, 166, 27 OBR 196, 198-199, 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1294. Leichtman acknowledges that he willingly entered the WLW radio studio to make a public radio appearance with Cunningham, who is known for his blowtorch rhetoric. Therefore, Leichtman's [92 Ohio App.3d 237] allegations do not support his assertion that Furman, Cunningham, or WLW intruded into his privacy.22
In his third count, Leichtman attempts to create a private right of action for violation of Cincinnati Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083, which makes it illegal to smoke in designated public places. Even if we are to assume, for argument, that a municipal regulation is tantamount to public policy established by a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the regulation has created rights for nonsmokers that did not exist at common law. Bd. of Health Reg., supra, at Sections 00083-7 and 00083-13. Therefore, because sanctions also are provided to enforce the regulation, there is no implied private remedy for its violation. R.C. 3707.99, 3707.48(C); Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 572 N.E.2d 87, 89-90; Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co. (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 245, 248-250, 75 O.O.2d 291, 293-294, 348 N.E.2d 144, 147 (superseded by statute on other grounds).23
Arguably, trivial cases are responsible for an avalanche of lawsuits in the courts. They delay cases that are important to individuals and corporations and that involve important social issues. The result is justice denied to litigants and their counsel who must wait for their day in court. However, absent circumstances that warrant sanctions for frivolous appeals under App.R. 23, we refuse to limit one's right to sue. Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution states, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."24
This case emphasizes the need for some form of alternative dispute resolution operating totally outside the court system as a means to provide an attentive ear to the parties and a resolution of disputes in a nominal case. Some need a forum in which they can express corrosive contempt for another without dragging their antagonist through the expense inherent in a lawsuit. Until such an alternative forum is created, Leichtman's battery claim, previously knocked out by the trial judge in the first round, now survives round two to advance again through the courts into round three.25
We affirm the trial court's judgment as to the first and third counts of the complaint, but we reverse that portion of the trial court's order that dismissed the battery claim in the second count of the complaint. This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with law on that claim only.26
DOAN, P.J., and HILDEBRANDT and GORMAN, JJ., concur.28
 Harmful contact: Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 25, Section 13, cited with approval in Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 524 N.E.2d 166, 167.29
 Offensive contact: Restatement, supra, at 30, Section 18. See, generally, Love at 99-100, 524 N.E.2d at 167, in which the court: (1) referred to battery as "intentional, offensive touching"; (2) defined offensive contact as that which is "offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity"; and (3) commented that if "an arrest is made by a mere touching * * * the touching is offensive and, unless privileged, is a 'battery.' " Id., 37 Ohio St.3d at 99, 524 N.E.2d at 167, fn. 3. See, also, Schultz v. Elm Beverage Shoppe (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 326, 328, 533 N.E.2d 349, 352, fn. 2 (citing Restatement, supra, at 22, Chapter 2, Introductory Note), in which the court identified an interest in personality as "freedom from offensive bodily contacts"; Keister v. Gaker (Nov. 8, 1978), Warren App. Nos. 219 and 223, unreported (battery is offensive touching).
Should health care professionals be allowed to administer life-saving, emergency treatment when there is a possibility that the patient would have refused?
475 N.W.2d 4262
Docket No. 123785.9
190 Mich.App. 141, 475 N.W.2d 42610
Court of Appeals of Michigan.11
Submitted Jan. 16, 1991, at Lansing.12
Decided July 8, 1991, at 9:05 a.m.13
Released for Publication Oct. 28, 1991.14
[475 N.W.2d 427] [190 MICHAPP 141] Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Stanley S. Schwartz and Richard L. Groffsky, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Stroup, Johnson & Tresidder, P.C. by Charles W. Johnson, Petoskey, for Michael V. Taylor, M.D.16
Before NEFF, P.J., and SHEPHERD and McDONALD, JJ.17
Plaintiffs, Cindy K. Werth and donald [190 MICHAPP 142] E. Werth, appeal as of right from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant, Michael V. Taylor, M.D. We affirm.19
Plaintiffs filed a civil battery claim against defendant Taylor based on his authorization of a blood transfusion for Cindy Werth despite plaintiffs' refusals. Plaintiffs also filed a medical malpractice claim against Taylor and other defendants. The medical malpractice claim is not the subject of this appeal.21
The facts are not in dispute. Cindy and her husband Donald are Jehovah's Witnesses. It is unquestioned that they are both devoted adherents to the tenets of their chosen faith. According to Cindy Werth's deposition testimony, one of the most deeply held of these tenets is the belief that it is a sin to receive blood transfusions.22
In August 1985, Cindy, the mother of two children, became pregnant with twins. About two months before the expected date of delivery, Cindy went to Alpena General Hospital to preregister. She filled out several forms, including a "Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion" form. Cindy went into labor on May 8, 1986, and entered Alpena General Hospital on that date. While she was being admitted, Donald signed another "Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion" form.23
Cindy gave birth to her twins on the evening of May 8, 1986. Following delivery, Cindy was found to be bleeding from her uterus. Around 11:30 p.m., Dr. Cheryl Parsons was called. She performed a pelvic examination and discovered a great deal of clotting and a fair amount of bleeding. Dr. Parsons [190 MICHAPP 143] then discussed performing a dilation of the cervix and curettage of the uterine lining (D & C). As a result, Dr. Parsons began discussing with plaintiffs their refusals of blood transfusions.24
Following this discussion, Cindy was taken to surgery. In the early hours of May 9, 1986, she was placed under general anesthesia, and Dr. Parsons proceeded to perform a D & C. The bleeding, however, continued. Defendant Taylor, an anesthesiologist, was then called to the hospital to examine Cindy. Cindy's blood pressure had risen significantly. At approximately 1:30 a.m., defendant Taylor observed mottling and cooling of the skin peripherally, premature ventricular activity, oozing of crystalloid material from her eyes, and a fairly rapid and significant fall in blood pressure. These observations prompted defendant Taylor to determine that a blood transfusion was medically necessary to preserve Cindy's life. He ordered the transfusion of packed red blood cells, but before the transfusion was given, Dr. Parsons informed him that Cindy was a Jehovah's Witness. Dr. Parsons testified that defendant responded by saying something like "that may be, but she needs the blood." A blood transfusion was then given.25
Plaintiffs thereafter filed their medical malpractice action, alleging negligence by various defendants, including Taylor, and alleging battery against defendant Taylor.26
Defendant Taylor filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that because Cindy's refusal was not conscious, competent, contemporaneous, and fully informed, defendant did not commit a battery in deciding to infuse blood. The trial court granted this motion and entered an order dismissing plaintiffs' claim against defendant Taylor.27
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition where their refusal of a blood transfusion [475 N.W.2d 428] was made deliberately and voluntarily. They also contend that defendant's decision to perform that procedure with knowledge of this express refusal resulted in a battery, as well as a violation of the hospital's promise to honor plaintiffs' religious convictions, and that the potentially life-threatening situation did not alter plaintiffs' conscious, deliberate, and unequivocal refusal. Plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in holding that society's interest in preventing minors from becoming wards of the court could override plaintiffs' religious beliefs.29
Defendant Taylor, on the other hand, contends that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition, because plaintiffs did not unequivocally refuse the blood transfusion. He claims that, in the face of a life-threatening emergency, without a fully conscious and contemporaneous refusal, his decision to transfuse blood was appropriate and the court did not err in finding an implicit consent to the procedure authorized by him. Defendant Taylor also contends that the state's interest in preserving life authorized him to override plaintiffs' right to refuse blood transfusions on religious grounds. He claims that, while a patient may knowingly decline treatment, the patient has no right to demand inadequate treatment, and the courts will not require that such be committed.30
Summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(10) may be granted where, except for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue regarding any [190 MICHAPP 145] material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.32
A motion for summary disposition under this subrule tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 168 Mich.App. 619, 626, 425 N.W.2d 480 (1988). The party opposing the motion has the burden of showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 180 Mich.App. 768, 773, 447 N.W.2d 864 (1989). Giving the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the court must determine whether a record might be developed which will leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Dumas, supra. All inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmovant. Dagen v. Hastings Mutual Ins. Co., 166 Mich.App. 225, 229, 420 N.W.2d 111 (1987). Before judgment may be granted, the court must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim asserted to be supported by evidence at trial. Peterfish v. Frantz, 168 Mich.App. 43, 48-49, 424 N.W.2d 25 (1988).33
A competent adult patient has the right to decline any and all forms of medical intervention, including lifesaving or life-prolonging treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See anno: Patient's right to refuse treatment allegedly necessary to sustain life, 93 A.L.R.3d 67. Indeed, the whole concept of informed consent to treatment leads to an inference of its converse--informed refusal of treatment. Put another way, a competent adult may choose to give or withhold consent to medical treatment.35
[190 MICHAPP 146] However, the law implies the consent of an unconscious patient to medical procedures needed to preserve the patient's life. Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 229, 221 N.W. 168 (1928). See alsoYoung v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 175 Mich.App. 132, 139, 437 N.W.2d 321 (1989). If a physician treats or operates on a patient without consent, he has committed an assault and battery and may be required to respond in damages. Id.; Banks v. Wittenberg, 82 Mich.App. 274, 279, 266 N.W.2d 788 (1978). Consent may be expressed or implied. Young, supra; Banks, supra, p. 280, 266 N.W.2d 788. It has been held that consent is implied where an emergency procedure is required and there is no opportunity to obtain actual consent or where the patient seeks treatment or otherwise manifests a willingness to submit to a particular treatment. Young, supra; Banks, supra.36
Here, the trial court determined that Cindy's refusals were made when she was contemplating merely routine elective surgery and not when life-threatening circumstances, were present and concluded that it could not be said that she made the decision to refuse a blood transfusion while in a competent state and while fully aware that death would result from such refusal. The record reflects the unexpected development of a medical emergency requiring blood transfusion to prevent death or serious compromise of the patient's well-being.38
The decision of the trial court is supported by one reached by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Estate of Dorone, 517 Pa. 3, 534 A.2d 452 (1987). In Dorone, the patient was a twenty-two-year-old Jehovah's Witness who required a blood transfusion during a cranial operation to [190 MICHAPP 147] relieve an acute subdural hematoma. Without the operation or transfusion, death was imminent. The patient was unconscious, and his parents refused consent to the blood transfusion. The court overruled the parents' refusal, stating:39
Turning to the ultimate decisions the judge rendered, we feel that they were absolutely required under the facts he had before him. Those facts established that medical intervention, which necessarily included blood transfusions, could preserve Mr. Dorone's life. When evidence of this nature is measured against third party speculation as to what an unconscious patient would want there can be no doubt that medical intervention is required. Indeed, in a situation like the present, where there is an emergency calling for an immediate decision, nothing less than a fully conscious contemporaneous decision by the patient will be sufficient to override evidence of medical necessity. [Id., p. 9, 534 A.2d 452.]40
Here, both plaintiffs signed "Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion" forms. Following Cindy's delivery of twins, Dr. Parsons discussed these refusals with both plaintiffs. Cindy recalled their conversation as follows:41
She--okay. We told her--she said, "I understand that you're one of Jehovah's Witnesses and that you won't take blood," and Don and I both said, "That's correct." And she said, "You mean to tell me if your wife's dying on the table that you're not going to give her blood?" And we said--Don said, "That's--well, I don't want her to have blood, but I don't want her to die. We want the alternative treatment."
* * * * * *
She said there would be no problem. It was a routine D & C, there was no problem with the blood.
* * * * * *
[190 MICHAPP 148] The idea of a blood transfusion, she made it sound that it wouldn't even be a problem. Blood wouldn't come into the picture. That's how I understood it.
Donald also testified regarding the conversation as follows:43
At the time of the consent form, she gave it to my wife and had her look it over and read it, and she said--she acknowledged us as being one of Jehovah's Witnesses, and then she said, "Would you accept blood?" And we replied, "No." And then she made the remark, "Even if she was to die, you'd let her die?"
And at that point, I questioned, I said, "Well, how serious of a, you know, condition was she?" And the reason why we asked that is because, like I say, in different situations like there are Witnesses who have gone to hospitals, you know, if there was some type of real emergency, a lot of times they're shipped out or flown out. Different ones have gone to Ann Arbor and other places.
So at that time, I was just kind of questioning, well, how serious was it, you know. First of all, you say it's a routine D & C; then you mention that if she was to die, and so that's why I questioned it, and then she reassured us that there was no problem, nothing to it.
The following colloquy then occurred between defense counsel and Donald:45
[475 N.W.2d 430] Q. So you never answered the question.
A. Oh, as far as the idea of dying?
A. I said no. The answer was no.
Q. Even if she was to die, you said "No blood."
Q. What did your wife say to that?
[190 MICHAPP 149] A. Well, she was right there and that was her feeling also.
Q. But you didn't have the feeling that that was part of the problem or a possibility? It was kind of an academic discussion, that she might die?
A. Well, she said it in a joking manner. It wasn't done as a serious matter. Being with a joking manner, that's why I asked her how serious it was and then she just--"Oh, there's no problem."
Q. Okay. So you weren't really biting the bullet because it didn't seem to be part of the problem that she was going to die or there was a risk of her dying?
A. At that point, no.
Dr. Parsons testified to the conversation as follows:47
I recall discussing with her and her husband the fact that they were Jehovah's Witnesses and that she indicated that this was true. And I said, "Is it true that you do not want any blood transfusions?" She said, "No." He looked at me and said, "Do you think it's that bad?" And I said, "Not right now." And I didn't get any further answer from him in terms of whether he felt that if it became that bad he might change his mind. And I left it at that.
She also described Donald's response as "wishy-washy."49
Following this discussion, Cindy underwent surgery. She was placed under general anesthesia, and Dr. Parsons performed a D & C. Cindy did not regain consciousness again until after the operation and transfusion of blood were performed. Defendant Taylor testified that he was aware, before deciding to infuse blood, that Cindy was a Jehovah's Witness. No attempt was made to bring Cindy to consciousness in order to obtain her approval, and defendant Taylor testified that this [190 MICHAPP 150] option was "foolhardy." No attempt was made to discuss his decision with Donald because defendant saw nothing to be gained from it. He did not believe Donald could give or deny permission for a blood transfusion.50
We agree with the principle in Dorone that it is the patient's fully informed, contemporaneous decision which alone is sufficient to override evidence of medical necessity. The fact that defendant did not obtain the consent of Cindy's husband does not preclude the granting of summary disposition. It is undisputed that Cindy was unconscious when the critical decision regarding the blood transfusion to avoid her death was being made. Her prior refusals had not been made when her life was hanging in the balance or when it appeared that death might be a possibility if a transfusion were not given. Clearly, her refusals were, therefore, not contemporaneous or informed. Thus, a record could not be developed regarding Cindy's refusal which would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ.52
Our holding in this case is narrow. Without contemporaneous refusal of treatment by a fully informed, competent adult patient, no action lies for battery and summary disposition was proper.53
Because of our resolution of this case, we need not address the issue whether the trial court erred in holding that the state had a valid interest in preventing Cindy's death.55
Should we hold people accountable for causing severe distress in others, even if no physical contact—or the threat thereof—was involved?
210 S.E.2d 1452
215 Va. 3383
Supreme Court of Virginia.5
Dec. 2, 1974.6
[210 S.E.2d 146] William M. McClenny, Amherst (McClenny Associates, Amherst, on brief), for plaintiff in error.7
Wm. Rosenberger, Jr., Lynchburg (Richard E. Spies, Charlottesville, on brief), for defendant in error.8
Before I'ANSON, C.J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.9
Plaintiff, Danny Lee Womack, instituted this action against the defendant, Rosalie Eldridge, to recover compensatory and punitive damages for mental shock and distress allegedly caused by the defendant's willful, wanton, malicious, fraudulent and deceitful acts and conduct toward him. The question of punitive damages was stricken by the trial court and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $45,000. The trial court set aside the verdict Non obstante veredicto on the ground that there could be no recovery for emotional distress in the absence [215 Va. 339] of 'physical damage or other bodily harm.' We granted plaintiff a writ of error. Defendant did not assign cross-error, although the record shows she excepted to many rulings in the court below and several of them are relied upon in her brief and argument before us.11
Plaintiff assigned numerous errors, but the controlling question is whether one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress absent any bodily injury.12
The evidence shows that defendant had been engaged in the business of investigating cases for attorneys for many years. She was employed by Richard E. Seifert and his attorney to obtain a photograph of the plaintiff to be used as evidence in the trial of Seifert, who was charged with sexually molesting two young boys. On May 27, 1970, about 8 a.m., defendant went to plaintiff's home and upon gaining admittance told him that she was a Mrs. Jackson from the newspaper and that she was writing an article on Skateland. Defendant asked plaintiff, who was a coach at Skateland, if she could take a picture of him for publication with the article, and he readily consented.13
Shortly thereafter defendant delivered the photograph to Seifert's counsel while he was representing Seifert at his preliminary hearing. Seifert's counsel showed plaintiff's photograph to the two young boys and asked if he was the one who molested them. When they replied that he was not, counsel withdrew the photograph and put it in his briefcase. However, the Commonwealth's Attorney then asked to see the photograph and requested additional information about the person shown in it. Defendant was then called to the stand and she supplied the plaintiff's name and address. Plaintiff's photograph in no way resembled Seifert, and the only excuse given by defendant for taking plaintiff's picture was that he was at Skateland when Seifert was arrested. However, the offenses alleged against Seifert did not occur at Skateland.14
The Commonwealth's Attorney then directed a detective to go to plaintiff's home and bring him to court. The detective told plaintiff that his photograph had been presented in court; that the Commonwealth's Attorney wanted him to appear at the proceedings; and that he could either appear voluntarily then or he would be summoned. Plaintiff agreed to go voluntarily. When [215 Va. 340] called as a witness, plaintiff testified as to the circumstances under [210 S.E.2d 147] which defendant had obtained his photograph. He also said that he had not molested any children and that he knew nothing about the charges against Seifert.15
A police officer questioned plaintiff several times thereafter. Plaintiff was also summoned to appear as a witness before the grand jury but he was not called. However, he was summoned to appear several times at Seifert's trial in the circuit court because of continuances of the cases.16
Plaintiff testified that he suffered great shock, distress and nervousness because of defendant's fraud and deceit and her wanton, willful and malicious conduct in obtaining his photograph and turning it over to Seifert's attorney to be used in court. He suffered great anxiety as to what people would think of him and feared that he would be accused of molesting the boys. He had been unable to sleep while the matter was being investigated. While testifying in the instant case he became emotional and incoherent. Plaintiff's wife also testified that her husband experienced great shock and mental depression from the involvement.17
The precise issue presented on this appeal has not been decided by this court.18
In the recent case of Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 31, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973), where we also clarified Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 437--438, 166 S.E. 550, 557 (1932), we held that when conduct is merely negligent, not willful, wanton or vindictive, and physical impact is lacking, there can be no recovery for emotional disturbance alone. However, where emotional disturbance is accompanied by physical injury there may be a recovery for negligent conduct, notwithstanding the lack of physical impact, provided the injured party proves by clear and convincing evidence a causal connection between the negligent act, the emotional disturbance and the physical injury.19
We have also said that a recovery is permitted for mental distress and physical injuries unaccompanied by actual physical contact where the injuries were caused by a willful, intentional tort. Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, Inc., 208 Va. 438, 441, 158 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1967).20
The case of Awtrey v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 121 Va. 284, 93 S.E. 570 (1917), relied upon by the defendant, is distinguishable on the facts from the present case. There, liability was based on [215 Va. 341] a negligent wrongful act; here, liability is based on willful, wanton, fraudulent and deceitful conduct.21
Courts from other jurisdictions are not in accord on whether there can be a recovery for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. However, most of the courts which have been presented with the question in recent years have held that there may be a recovery against one who by his extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes another severe emotional distress. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, § 8 at 120, and the many cases there cited.22
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 at 71, provides:23
'(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.'
In comment (i) to the Restatement it is expressly stated that this rule also covers a situation where the actor knows that distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.25
A great majority of cases allowing recovery for such a cause of action do so when the act was intentional and the wrongdoer desired the emotional distress or knew or should have known that it would likely result. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Burton, [210 S.E.2d 148] 104 Ind.App. 576, 580, 12 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1938); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950); Boyle v. Chandler, Del.Super., 3 W.W.Harr 323, 33 Del. 323, 329, 138 A. 273, 276 (1927); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346--347 (1961); Prosser on Torts, 'Infliction of Mental Distress,' § 12 at 60 (4th ed. 1971).26
In Samms, the Supreme Court of Utah aptly stated:27
'. . . (T)he best considered view recognizes an action for severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact or physical injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, Or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the [215 Va. 342] generally accepted standards of decency and morality.' (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 346--347.
We adopt the view that a cause of action will lie for emotional distress, unaccompanied by physical injury, provided four elements are shown: One, the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless. This element is satisfied where the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where he intended his specific conduct and knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result. Two, the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. This requirement is aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are involved. Three, there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress. Four, the emotional distress was severe.29
'It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.' Restatement (Second) of Torts, Supra, at 77.30
In the case at bar, reasonable men may disagree as to whether defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous and whether plaintiff's emotional distress was severe. Thus, the questions presented were for a jury to determine. A jury could conclude from the evidence presented that defendant willfully, recklessly, intentionally and deceitfully obtained plaintiff's photograph for the purpose of permitting her employers to use it as a defense in a criminal case without considering the effect it would have on the plaintiff. There is nothing in the evidence that even suggests that plaintiff may have been involved in the child molesting cases. The record shows that the only possible excuse for involving the plaintiff was that Seifert was arrested at the place where plaintiff was employed. A reasonable person would or should have recognized the likelihood of the serious mental distress that would be caused in involving an innocent person in child molesting cases. If the two boys had hesitated in answering [215 Va. 343] that the man in the photograph was not the one who had molested them, it is evident that the finger of suspicion would have been pointed at the plaintiff.31
Defendant contended in her brief, and in oral argument before us, that the trial court erred in granting instruction 1--A in that it was contradictory and misled the jury; that the amount of damages fixed by the jury was excessive; and that the action of the Commonwealth's Attorney in causing plaintiff's name to be revealed was an intervening cause which absolved her of any liability.32
[210 S.E.2d 149] We will not consider those contentions because defendant did not assign cross-error. Beasley v. Barnes, 201 Va. 593, 598, 113 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1960); Blue Ridge Poultry and Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 141, 176 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1970); Rule 5:7, Rules of Court.33
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is reversed, the jury verdict reinstated, and final judgment hereby entered for the plaintiff.34
Judgment reversed, jury verdict reinstated, and final judgment.35
 Our research reveals that at least 26 jurisdictions permit such causes of action, while apparently 7 do not.
Assault and battery are broad torts: they can be used to cover many different situations, perhaps including ones in which barriers or the threat of force are used to force someone to go where he or she doesn’t want to go, or to keep a person in one place without assent. Yet tort law has evolved a more specific tort to cover that particular set of situations: false imprisonment.
What, if anything, does false imprisonment accomplish as a category that assault and battery cannot? What plausible situations could arise that would test a colloquial notion of what counts as false imprisonment, and how can we best sort those out? Are there “good” imprisonments that can come up in everyday life that should be excused from the tort’s reach?
Should a defendant be liable for false imprisonment when it did not apply force, use the threat of force, nor assert its authority to confine the plaintiff?
[466 N.E.2d 1309] 466 N.E.2d 13092
126 Ill.App.3d 46, 81 Ill.Dec. 5073
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Fifth Division.
July 20, 1984.7
[126 Ill.App.3d 47] John Panici, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.8
Hubbard, Hubbard, O'Brien & Hall, Chicago, for defendant-appellee; Frederick W. Temple, John Skapars, Chicago, of counsel.9
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court granting defendant corporation's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against her because a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning her charge that she was [466 N.E.2d 1310] [81 Ill.Dec. 508] falsely detained and imprisoned. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the trial court's decision.11
Count I of plaintiff's unverified two-count complaint alleged that plaintiff was employed as a clerk in defendant's donut shop in Woodridge, Illinois, for approximately three years; that on or about April 8, 1981, defendant, through its agents and employees, Ralph Bell and James Cesario, accused her of selling donuts without registering sales and thereby pocketing defendant's monies; and that she was falsely detained and imprisoned against her will in a room located on defendant's premises, with force, and without probable and reasonable cause, by defendant's employees. Count I of her complaint also alleged that as a result of defendant's employees' wilful and wanton false imprisonment, she was exposed to public disgrace; greatly injured in her good name and reputation; suffered, and still suffers, great mental anguish, humiliation and shock; wrongfully terminated from her employment; required to seek medical attention; all of which prevented her from attending to her usual affairs.12
Defendant filed its answer on August 19, 1981, denying the material allegations of Count I of plaintiff's complaint. Further, on February 9, 1983, defendant amended its answer by filing an affirmative defense that alleged, inter alia, it was a merchant; that any questioning of plaintiff by its employees was performed only after said employees had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff had committed [126 Ill.App.3d 48] retail theft while working for defendant; that any alleged detention for questioning was limited solely to an inquiry as to whether plaintiff had failed to ring certain retail sales; and that such inquiry took place in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time.13
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count I of the complaint set forth the argument that plaintiff's complaint, sounding in false imprisonment and alleging that she was held against her will by her employers in a certain room of a Winchell's Donut House, was contradicted by her testimony in a discovery deposition. Defendant argued that plaintiff testified in this deposition that she had voluntarily complied with Messrs. Bell and Cesario's request to speak privately with her regarding the matter of shortages in her register on April 9, 1981. Defendant further argued that plaintiff testified that when she no longer wished to continue her conversation with her employers, she got up and went home, electing never to return to her job.14
The motion included portions of plaintiff's deposition which disclosed the following. James Cesario telephoned plaintiff at her home at 4:30 p.m. on April 9, 1981, and asked her to come down to the donut shop; he did not explain his reasons for wanting her to do so. As a result of this call, plaintiff walked to the store from her home, arriving ten minutes later. Upon her arrival at the store, Cesario asked her to accompany him into the baking room, which was located at the rear of the store; Ralph Bell was also present in the room. After Cesario asked plaintiff to sit down, she indicated that they (Cesario and Bell) closed the door and locked it by putting a "little latch on." She stated that the two men told her that they had proof that spotters going from store to store had purchased two dozen donuts from her, but that her register had not shown the sale. After refusing her request to view the "proof," plaintiff stated that she was "too upset" to respond to their questioning regarding the length of time that her alleged "shorting" of the cash drawer had been going on.15
She further stated that defendant's employees never told her that she had to answer their questions or face the loss of her job; never directly threatened to fire her; and made no threats of any kind to her during the interrogation. She further testified that she at no time during the interrogation feared for her safety; that she at no time refused to answer any question put to her; that there was never a point in the interrogation that she said, "I want to leave" and was prevented from doing so; and that she got up, left the [466 N.E.2d 1311] [81 Ill.Dec. 509] room and went home when she first decided to do so.16
Plaintiff's written response to defendant's motion for summary [126 Ill.App.3d 49] judgment did not contradict the statements that she had made in her discovery deposition. In her affidavit filed in support of her response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff averred that (1) she left the baking room after she began to shake, and when she felt that she was becoming ill; and (2) she was terminated from her employment by defendant.17
The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals from that order. Count II of her complaint alleging defamation of character remains pending in the trial court.18
It is well established that summary judgment determines whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and summarily disposes of cases where no such fact exists in order to avoid congestion of trial calendars and the expense of unnecessary trials. (Loveland v. City of Lewistown (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 190, 192, 39 Ill.Dec. 700, 405 N.E.2d 453.) The motion should be granted where the pleadings, exhibits, depositions and affidavits of record show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c).) In addition, discovery depositions may be used in the context of summary judgment proceedings "for any purpose for which an affidavit may be used." See 87 Ill.2d R. 212(a)(4); see also Sierens v. Clausen (1975), 60 Ill.2d 585, 588, 328 N.E.2d 559.20
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must construe pleadings, depositions and affidavits included therein most strictly against the movant and most liberally in favor of the non-movant. (Blaylock v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 35, 37, 1 Ill.Dec. 451, 356 N.E.2d 639.) The defendant may at any time move for summary judgment in his favor for all or any part of relief sought against him. (Kusiciel v. La Salle National Bank (1982), 106 Ill.App.3d 333, 338, 62 Ill.Dec. 245, 435 N.E.2d 1217.) However, because summary judgment is a drastic method of disposing of litigation, it should be granted only when the right of the movant is clear and free from doubt. Hillblom v. Ivancsits (1979), 76 Ill.App.3d 306, 310, 32 Ill.Dec. 172, 395 N.E.2d 119.21
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment as there exists a genuine issue of material fact. She posits that she felt compelled to remain in the baking room so that she could protect her reputation by protesting her innocence to the two men, and that she left the room once she began to shake and feel ill. Additionally, she attributes her "serious emotional upset" to her feelings of intimidation that she contends were caused [126 Ill.App.3d 50] by: James Cesario's sitting directly next to her during questioning, yellow pad and pencil in hand; Ralph Bell's repeated statement that his briefcase contained proof of her guilt; and his raised voice.22
The common law tort of false imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion. (Johnson v. Jackson (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 251, 258, 193 N.E.2d 485; Shelton v. Barry (1946), 328 Ill.App. 497, 506, 66 N.E.2d 697.) Imprisonment has been defined as "any unlawful exercise or show of force by which a person is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain or to go where he does not wish to go." (McKendree v. Christy (1961), 29 Ill.App.2d 195, 199, 172 N.E.2d 380.) In order for a false imprisonment to be present, there must be actual or legal intent to restrain. Campbell v. Kaczmarek (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 465, 469, 350 N.E.2d 97.23
Unlawful restraint may be effected by words alone, by acts alone or both (Hassenauer v. F.W. Woolworth Co. (1942), 314 Ill.App. 569, 41 N.E.2d 979 (abstract)); actual force is unnecessary to an action in false imprisonment. (Winans v. Congress Hotel Co. (1922), 227 Ill.App. 276, 282.) [466 N.E.2d 1312] [81 Ill.Dec. 510] The Restatement of Torts specifies ways in which an actor may bring about the confinement required as an element of false imprisonment, including (1) actual or apparent physical barriers; (2) overpowering physical force, or by submission to physical force; (3) threats of physical force; (4) other duress; and (5) asserted legal authority. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 38-41 (1965).24
It is essential, however, that the confinement be against the plaintiff's will and if a person voluntarily consents to the confinement, there can be no false imprisonment. (Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 479, 481, 40 Ill.Dec. 886, 407 N.E.2d 117.) "Moral pressure, as where the plaintiff remains with the defendant to clear himself of suspicion of theft, * * *, is not enough; nor, as in the case of assault, are threats for the future * * *. Any remedy for such wrongs must lie with the more modern tort of the intentional infliction of mental distress." Prosser, Torts p 11, at 45 (4th ed. 1971).25
Plaintiff principally relies on the court's decision in Marcus v. Liebman (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 337, 16 Ill.Dec. 613, 375 N.E.2d 486, for support of her position that summary judgment should not have been granted in the instant case. In Marcus v. Liebman, the court extensively examined the concept that threats of a future action are not enough to constitute confinement. (59 Ill.App.3d 337, 341, 16 Ill.Dec. 613, 375 N.E.2d 486.) There, the defendant psychiatrist threatened to have plaintiff committed to the Elgin State Hospital, and the Marcus court found that this was a present threat, [126 Ill.App.3d 51] constituting false imprisonment, as opposed to a threat of future action. The court in Marcus concluded that the lower court had incorrectly directed a verdict for the defendant, and reversed and remanded the case for trial on the question of imprisonment. The court noted that plaintiff was already voluntarily committed to the psychiatric wing of a private hospital when the defendant made the threat to commit her to a state mental hospital and reasoned, "[A]t the time the alleged threat was made plaintiff was already confined. It was certainly reasonable for the plaintiff to believe that before her release [from the private hospital], commitment procedures could have been concluded." 59 Ill.App.3d 337, 341, 16 Ill.Dec. 613, 375 N.E.2d 486.26
Our analysis of the Marcus decision, as well as the other cases cited by plaintiff, does not support plaintiff's position. All of these cases are easily distinguishable from the present case, as in each, either physical restraint or present threats of such were present.27
In the case at bar, we are confronted with plaintiff's testimony, given under oath, that she voluntarily accompanied James Cesario to the baking room; that she stayed in the room in order to protect her reputation; that she was never threatened with the loss of her job; that she was never in fear of her safety; and that at no time was she prevented from exiting the baking room. Her affidavit, in which she averred that she left the baking room after she began to shake and when she felt that she was becoming ill, does not place into issue material facts which she had previously removed from contention. (Fountaine v. Hadlock (1971), 132 Ill.App.2d 343, 347, 270 N.E.2d 222.) In her discovery deposition, given under oath, she stated that she "got up and left" when Ralph Bell asked her how long the cash register "shorting" had been going on.28
In the tort of false imprisonment, it is not enough for the plaintiff to have felt "compelled" to remain in the baking room in order to protect her reputation (see Prosser, Torts, § 11); for the evidence must establish a restraint against the plaintiff's will, as where she yields to force, to the threat of force or the assertion of authority. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 38-41 (1965).) In the present case, our search of the record reveals no evidence that plaintiff yielded to constraint of a threat, express or implied, or to physical force of any kind. Also, absent evidence that plaintiff accompanied Cesario against her will, we cannot say that she was imprisoned or unlawfully detained by defendant's [466 N.E.2d 1313] [81 Ill.Dec. 511] employees. Finally, we find no merit to plaintiff's argument that defendant's affirmative defense constituted an admission of an unlawful restraint.29
[126 Ill.App.3d 52] For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, as there exists no question of material fact in the present case.30
MEJDA, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.