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IV.A. Consent
  • 1 Hart v. Geysel--"The Fatal Prize Fight"

    Should a tort be recognized when both parties agreed to engage in harmful contact?

    1

    294 P. 570Supreme Court of Washington.

    HART

    v.

    GEYSEL et al.

    No. 22490.Dec. 29, 1930.
    2

    En Banc.

    3

    Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester A. Batchelor, Judge.

    4

    Action by Dean E. Hart, as administrator of the estate of Hamilton I. Cartwright, deceased, against Cecil Geysel and others. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.

    5

    Affirmed.

    6

    HOLCOMB and FULLERTON, JJ., dissenting.

    7

    Bell, McNeil & Bowles, J. Speed Smith and Henry Elliott, Jr., all of Seattle, for appellant.

    8

    Caldwell & Lycette, Eggerman & Rosling, A. C. Van Soelen, Bruce MacDougall, and Todd, Holman & Sprague, all of Seattle, for respondents.

    10

    Opinion

    11

    MAIN, J.

    12

    This action was brought by the administrator of the estate of Hamilton I. Cartwright, deceased, who died as the result of a blow received in a prize fight. To the amended complaint, which will be referred to as the complaint, each of the defendants interposed a demurrer, which was sustained. The plaintiff refused to plead further and elected to stand upon the complaint. A judgment was entered dismissing the action, from which the plaintiff appeals.

    13

    February 5, 1929, Hamilton I. Cartwright and Cecil Geysel engaged in a prize fight in the city of Seattle, during which Cartwright received a blow which caused his death. In the complaint there are no facts showing that the mutual combat was engaged in in anger, that there was malicious intent to seriously injure, or that there was excessive force.

    14

    The controlling question is whether the action can be maintained for wrongful death when the encounter, though unlawful, was entered into with the consent of both parties.

    15

    Section 2556, Rem. Comp. Stat., makes prize fighting unlawful and provides that one engaging therein shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, with a proviso which is not here material.

    16

    The administrator has no greater rights pertaining to a recovery of damages than would the deceased have had, had he lived and brought an action for any injuries that he may have received. Ostheller v. Spokane & Indland Empire R. Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 P. 630.

    17

    Upon the question stated, the adjudicated cases, as well as the text-writers, are in conflict. One line supports what is known as the majority rule, and the other, the minority. The majority rule has been stated as follows:

    18

    ‘Where the parties engage in mutual combat in anger, each is civilly liable to the other for any physical injury inflicted by him during the fight. The fact that the parties voluntarily engaged in the combat is no defense to an action by either of them to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted upon him by the other.’

    19

    This rule is supported by the cases of Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212, 23 A. 630, 15 L. R. A. 853; Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531, 5 Am. Rep. 230; Barholt v. Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N. E. 185, 4 Am. St. Rep. 535; McNeil v. Mullin, 70 Kan. 634, 79 P. 168; Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 119 N. W. 458, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907, 131 Am. St. Rep. 636, 17 Ann. Cas. 1047; Colby McClendon, 85 Okl. 293, 206 P. 207, 30 A. L. R. 196; Royer v. Belcher, 100 W. Va. 694, 131 S. E. 556, 47 A. L. R. 1089; Littledike v. Wood, 69 Utah, 323, 255 P. 172.

    20

    The minority rule has been stated as follows:

    21

    ‘Where parties engage in a mutual combat in anger, the act of each is unlawful and relief will be denied them in a civil action; at least, in the absence of a showing of excessive force or malicious intent to do serious injury upon the part of the defendant.’

    22

    The cases of White v. Whittal, 113 Mich. 493, 71 N. W. 1118; Smith v. Simon, 69 Mich. 481, 37 N. W. 548; McNeil v. Choate, 197 Ky. 682, 247 S. W. 955; Lykins v. Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, 137 S. W. 852; Wright v. Starr, 42 Nev. 41, 179 P. 877, 6 A. L. R. 981, support this rule.

    23

    With reference to the two rules, after reviewing the authorities, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the comparatively recent case of Colby v. McClendon, 85 Okl. 293, 206 P. 207, 209, 30 A. L. R. 196, said:

    24

    ‘This court has never passed upon the question, but it seems that the majority rule is supported by the best reasoning. We think it should be followed in a case where the parties enter into a mutual combat with deadly weapons. The minority rule is announced in cases where the injury resulted from fist fights, although the case of Lykins v. Hamrick, supra, was where parties were engaged in a cutting scrape. We think it would be against public policy to apply the minority rule in a case where persons enter into a mutual combat with deadly weapons.’

    25

    In each of the cases which support the majority rule, the combat was entered into in anger, with a malicious intent to seriously injure, and in some of them the question of excessive force was present as bearing upon the question of damages. In the cases which support the minority rule, the encounter, or fist fight, as it may be called, was entered into in anger, from which it would be necessarily inferred that there was an intent to do injury.

    26

    The majority rule carries into a civil action, where one party sues the other for damages for something which has been done in violation of positive law, the principle applied in criminal prosecutions by the state to the effect that the consent of one or both of the parties does not prevent such a prosecution. The minority rule does not apply this principle when a civil action is brought by one of the parties against the other for damages which have been sustained in a combat consented to by both parties, but which was in violation of positive law. The authorities supporting the majority rule recognize that if the thing done is not one prohibited by positive law, for which a penalty is imposed then consent is a complete defense in a civil action for damages. The majority rule is an exception to two generally well-recognized and accepted principles of law: (a) That one who has consented to suffer a particular invasion of his private right has no right to complain; and (b) that no one shall profit by his own wrongdoing. The minority rule recognizes and applies these principles.

    27

    The facts in the case now before us do not bring it within the authorities supporting the majority rule, because here there are no facts which show anger, malicious intent to injure, or excessive force. It may be stated that the facts of this case do not contain one element of the minority rule, that of anger. It is unnecessary, as we view it, in the present case to adopt either rule. It is sufficient to say that in our opinion one who engages in prize fighting, even though prohibited by positive law, and sustains an injury, should not have a right to recover any damages that he may sustain as the result of the combat, which he expressly consented to and engaged in as a matter of business or sport. To enforce the criminal statute against prize fighting, it is not necessary to reward the one that got the worst of the encounter at the expense of his more fortunate opponent. This view is supported by the rule tentatively adopted by the American Law Institute in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, and is discussed in American Institute Treatise No. 1(a) Supporting Restatement No. 1, Torts, chapter V, section 75, beginning at page 172, 1925. In part, it is there said:

    28

    ‘Notwithstanding the numerical weight of authority against the view that an assent to a breach of the peace is a legally effective consent to such invasions of interest of personality as are involved therein the minority view is preferred for the following reasons:

    29

    ‘1. The majority view is obviously an exception to the general principle that one who has sufficiently expressed his willingness to suffer a particular invasion has no right to complaint if another acts upon his consent so given. The very nature of rights of personality, which are in freedom to dispose of one's interests of personality as one pleases, fundamentally requires this to be so. There is a further principle, applicable not only in tort law but throughout the whole field of law, and perhaps more conspicuously in other subjects, to the effect that no man shall profit by his own wrongdoing.

    30

    ‘The majority view is an exception to both of these two fundamental principles. Clearly if a plaintiff has consented to being struck by another in the course of a brawl, his right to the control of his person and to determine by whom and how it shall be touched has not been invaded. And it is equally clear that if he has so expressed his consent to the blow that, were he not party to a breach of the peace, his assent would be an operative consent and so bar his liability, he is profiting by the illegality of his conduct if because he is party to the breach of the peace he gains a right of action which but for his criminal joinder therein he would not have had.

    31

    ‘The majority view, being, as it is, an exception to two such otherwise universal principles of law, can be sustained only if it is founded upon authorities which were not only based upon sound reason when announced but which are based upon reasons which still remain sound and convincing, or if the exception is one which is required to carry into effect some weighty public policy.’

    32

    In the opinion in the case of Milam v. Milam, 46 Wash. 468, 90 P. 595, neither of the above rules was mentioned or discussed, and we do not regard that case as controlling. There is some language in it which leads to the belief that it was decided on the theory of excessive force.

    33

    The appellant cites a number of cases which hold that consent to an abortion by a patient is no defense to a subsequent action for damages against the doctor for performing the operation in a negligent manner, but if that by the rule in such cases it is not necessarily applicable to the facts now before us. We here distinctly do not express any opinion upon whether consent to an abortion precludes a right of recovery for the negligent act of the doctor in performing the operation.The judgment will be affirmed.

    34

    MITCHELL, C. J., and PARKER, TOLMAN, BEALS, MILLARD and BEELER, JJ., concur.

    35

    HOLCOMB, J. (dissenting).

    36

    I am unable to concur in the prevailing opinion because it is contrary to the better reasoning as stated in what is called the majority rule, is contrary to public policy, and sets a bad precedent.

    37

    The first error contained in the prevailing opinion is that there are no facts in the complaint showing that the mutual combat was engaged in in anger, that there was malicious intent to seriously injure, or that there was excessive force.

    38

    If excessive force be necessary as an element of recovery in a case where a mutual combat was voluntarily engaged in, the complaint alleges it in the following language:

    39

    ‘* * * The said Cecil Geysel, having engaged and while engaged in the said unlawful encounter with the said Hamilton I. Cartwright, continued fighting with the said Hamilton I. Cartwright and did unlawfully and unjustifiably assault, strike, beat and injure the said Hamilton I. Cartwright, and did strike the said Hamilton I. Cartwright so cruelly and with such force and violence as to knock him down and cause him to fall upon the floor, from which said assault, striking, beating and blows, and from the injuries received from the falling the said Hamilton I. Cartwright died.’

    40

    The foregoing certainly was an allegation of excessive force and brings and case squarely under our own decision in Milam v. Milam, 46 Wash. 468, 90 P. 595, which is distinguished in the majority opinion upon the ground that it was decided on the theory of excessive force.

    41

    The principal contention in the Milam Case, as shown by the briefs filed therein, was that the affray in that case was mutual and voluntary, and therefore the act committed was not done against the will of the party assaulted.

    42

    Unless this court intended to deny that proposition, there could be no recovery even when excessive force appears, just as in the present case.

    43

    For once, I am unable to agree with either the reasoning or conclusions arrived at tentatively by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law, reference to which is made in the majority opinion, as being the better reasoning and the better principle to follow in deciding this case. I admit that ancient precedents should not govern where they are bad. One ancient case criticized in the Restatement, supra, was that of Matthew v. Ollerton, Comerbach 218, 90 Eng. Reprint 438, which is said to be a mere dictum stating: ‘If a man license another to beat him, such license is void as it is against the peace.’ This dictum, it is said, was followed in a more modern case, Boulter v. Clark, Buller's Nisi Prius, 16, where the presiding judge ruled that the fighting being unlawful the consent to fight, if proved, would not bar the plaintiff.

    44

    Although that may be but dictum and of faulty, human origin, there is ancient and Divine authority in the Mosaic law:

    45

    ‘And if men strive together, and one smite another, with a stone, or with his fist and he die not but keepeth his bed; if he rise again, and walk about upon his staff, then he that smote him be quit; only he shall pay for the loss of his time and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.’ Exoduls XXI:18, 19.

    46

    See, also, Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531, 5 Am. Rep. 230; McNeil v. Mullin, 70 Kan. 634, 79 P. 168; Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212, 23 A. 630, 15 L. R. A. 853; Littledike v. Wood, 69 Utah. 323, 255 P. 172.

    47

    Our statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., § 2556, makes prize fighting unlawful. Hence, there could be no lawful consent to such a combat. Physical combats are against the peace anyway. Had it been a duel, it would have been unlawful and consent to fight a duel would not prevent recovery by either those injured, on the ground of excessive force, or the heirs or personal representatives of those injured.

    48

    The reasoning of Judge Cooley is, to my mind, greatly superior to the reasoning employed in the Restatement of the Law on Torts. Judge Cooley reasons as follows, Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 282:

    49

    ‘It is implied, in an assault or battery, that it is committed against the assent of the person assaulted; but there are some things a man can never assent to, and therefore his license in such cases can constitute no excuse. He can never consent, for instance, to the taking of his own life. His life is not his to take or give away; it would be criminal in him to take it, and equally criminal in any one else who should deprive him of it by his consent. The person who, in a duel, kills another, is not suffered to plead the previous arrangements and the voluntary exposure to death by agreement, as any excuse whatever. The life of an individual is guarded in the interest of the State, and not in the interest of the individual alone; and not his life only is protected, but his person as well. Consent cannot justify an assault.

    50

    ‘But suppose in the duel one is not killed, but only wounded; may he have an action against his adversary for this injury? If there is any reason why he may not, it must be because he has consented to what has been done. Volenti non fit injuria. But if he had no right or power to consent, and the consent expressed in words was wholly illegal and void, the question then is, how a, consent which the law forbids can be accepted in law as a legal protection?

    51

    ‘Consent is generally a full and perfect shield when that is complained of as a civil injury which was consented to. * * *

    52

    ‘But in case of a breach of the peace it is different. The State is wronged by this, and forbids it on public grounds. If men fight, the State will punish them. If one is injured, the law will not listen to an excuse based on a breach of the law. There are three parties here, one being the State, which, for its own good, does not suffer the others to deal on a basis of contract with the public peace. The rule of law is therefore clear and unquestionable, that consent to an assault is no justification. Where a combat involves a breach of the peace, the mutual consent of the parties thereto is to be regarded as unlawful, and as not depriving the injured party, or, for that matter, each injured party, from recovering damages for injuries received from the unlawful acts of the other.’

    53

    See, also, 1 Jaggard on Torts, 203, to the same effect.

    54

    I am convinced the complaint stated a cause of action under the correct principles of law and the judgment should be reversed.

    55

    FULLERTON, J.
    I concur in the conclusion of Judge HOLCOMB.

  • 2 Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals--"The No-Foul-But-Severe-Harm Case"

    Does the nature of a rough-and-tumble activity like professional football excuse potential tort liability arising from the game?

    1
    601 F.2d 516 (1979)
    2
    Dale Hackbart, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., and Charles "Booby" Clark, Defendants-Appellees.
    3
    No. 77-1812.
    4

    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

    5
    Argued March 13, 1979.
    6
    Decided June 11, 1979.
    7

    517*517 518*518 Mary Butler, of Johnson & Mahoney, P. C., Denver, Colo. (Roger F. Johnson, Denver, Colo., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

    8

    Robert G. Stachler, of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio (William C. McClearn, of Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., and Thomas T. Terp, of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief), for defendants-appellees.

    9

    Before DOYLE, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

    10

    WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

    11

    The question in this case is whether in a regular season professional football game an injury which is inflicted by one professional football player on an opposing player can give rise to liability in tort where the injury was inflicted by the intentional stricking of a blow during the game.

    12

    The injury occurred in the course of a game between the Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati Bengals, which game was being played in Denver in 1973. The Broncos' defensive back, Dale Hackbart, was the recipient of the injury and the Bengals' offensive back, Charles "Booby" Clark, inflicted the blow which produced it.

    13

    By agreement the liability question was determined by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado without a jury. The judge resolved the liability issue in favor of the Cincinnati team and Charles Clark. Consistent with this result, final judgment was entered for Cincinnati and the appeal challenges this judgment. In essence the trial court's reasons for rejecting plaintiff's claim were that professional football is a species of warfare and that so much physical force is tolerated and the magnitude of the force exerted is so great that it renders injuries not actionable in 519*519 court; that even intentional batteries are beyond the scope of the judicial process.

    14

    Clark was an offensive back and just before the injury he had run a pass pattern to the right side of the Denver Broncos' end zone. The injury flowed indirectly from this play. The pass was intercepted by Billy Thompson, a Denver free safety, who returned it to mid-field. The subject injury occurred as an aftermath of the pass play.

    15

    As a consequence of the interception, the roles of Hackbart and Clark suddenly changed. Hackbart, who had been defending, instantaneously became an offensive player. Clark, on the other hand, became a defensive player. Acting as an offensive player, Hackbart attempted to block Clark by throwing his body in front of him. He thereafter remained on the ground. He turned, and with one knee on the ground, watched the play following the interception.

    16

    The trial court's finding was that Charles Clark, "acting out of anger and frustration, but without a specific intent to injure * * * stepped forward and struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of the kneeling plaintiff's head and neck with sufficient force to cause both players to fall forward to the ground." Both players, without complaining to the officials or to one another, returned to their respective sidelines since the ball had changed hands and the offensive and defensive teams of each had been substituted. Clark testified at trial that his frustration was brought about by the fact that his team was losing the game.

    17

    Due to the failure of the officials to view the incident, a foul was not called. However, the game film showed very clearly what had occurred. Plaintiff did not at the time report the happening to his coaches or to anyone else during the game. However, because of the pain which he experienced he was unable to play golf the next day. He did not seek medical attention, but the continued pain caused him to report this fact and the incident to the Bronco trainer who gave him treatment. Apparently he played on the specialty teams for two successive Sundays, but after that the Broncos released him on waivers. (He was in his thirteenth year as a player.) He sought medical help and it was then that it was discovered by the physician that he had a serious neck fracture injury.

    18

    Despite the fact that the defendant Charles Clark admitted that the blow which had been struck was not accidental, that it was intentionally administered, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that the game of professional football is basically a business which is violent in nature, and that the available sanctions are imposition of penalties and expulsion from the game. Notice was taken of the fact that many fouls are overlooked; that the game is played in an emotional and noisy environment; and that incidents such as that here complained of are not unusual.

    19

    The trial court spoke as well of the unreasonableness of applying the laws and rules which are a part of injury law to the game of professional football, noting the unreasonableness of holding that one player has a duty of care for the safety of others. He also talked about the concept of assumption of risk and contributory fault as applying and concluded that Hackbart had to recognize that he accepted the risk that he would be injured by such an act.

    21
    I.

    23
    THE ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS
    24

    1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that as a matter of policy the principles of law governing the infliction of injuries should be entirely refused where the injury took place in the course of the game.

    25

    2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the employee was not vicariously liable for an activity for which he had not received express authorization?

    26

    3. Whether it was error to receive in evidence numerous episodes of violence which were unrelated to the case at bar, that is, incidents of intentional infliction of injury which occurred in other games.

    27

    4. Whether it was error for the trial court to receive in evidence unrelated acts on the part of the plaintiff.

    28

    520*520 5. The final issue is whether the evidence justifies consideration by the court of the issue of reckless conduct as it is defined in A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Torts Second, § 500, because (admittedly) the assault and battery theory is not available because that tort is governed by a one-year statute of limitations.

    30
    II.

    32
    WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JUDGMENT
    33

    The evidence at the trial uniformly supported the proposition that the intentional striking of a player in the head from the rear is not an accepted part of either the playing rules or the general customs of the game of professional football. The trial court, however, believed that the unusual nature of the case called for the consideration of underlying policy which it defined as common law principles which have evolved as a result of the case to case process and which necessarily affect behavior in various contexts. From these considerations the belief was expressed that even intentional injuries incurred in football games should be outside the framework of the law. The court recognized that the potential threat of legal liability has a significant deterrent effect, and further said that private civil actions constitute an important mechanism for societal control of human conduct. Due to the increase in severity of human conflicts, a need existed to expand the body of governing law more rapidly and with more certainty, but that this had to be accomplished by legislation and administrative regulation. The judge compared football to coal mining and railroading insofar as all are inherently hazardous. Judge Matsch said that in the case of football it was questionable whether social values would be improved by limiting the violence.

    34

    Thus the district court's assumption was that Clark had inflicted an intentional blow which would ordinarily generate civil liability and which might bring about a criminal sanction as well, but that since it had occurred in the course of a football game, it should not be subject to the restraints of the law; that if it were it would place unreasonable impediments and restraints on the activity. The judge also pointed out that courts are ill-suited to decide the different social questions and to administer conflicts on what is much like a battlefield where the restraints of civilization have been left on the sidelines.

    35

    We are forced to conclude that the result reached is not supported by evidence.

    37
    III.

    39
    WHETHER INTENTIONAL INJURY IS ALLOWED BY EITHER WRITTEN RULE OR CUSTOM
    40

    Plaintiff, of course, maintains that tort law applicable to the injury in this case applies on the football field as well as in other places. On the other hand, plaintiff does not rely on the theory of negligence being applicable. This is in recognition of the fact that subjecting another to unreasonable risk of harm, the essence of negligence, is inherent in the game of football, for admittedly it is violent. Plaintiff maintains that in the area of contributory fault, a vacuum exists in relationship to intentional infliction of injury. Since negligence does not apply, contributory negligence is inapplicable. Intentional or reckless contributory fault could theoretically at least apply to infliction of injuries in reckless disregard of the rights of others. This has some similarity to contributory negligence and undoubtedly it would apply if the evidence would justify it. But it is highly questionable whether a professional football player consents or submits to injuries caused by conduct not within the rules, and there is no evidence which we have seen which shows this. However, the trial court did not consider this question and we are not deciding it.

    41

    Contrary to the position of the court then, there are no principles of law which allow a court to rule out certain tortious conduct by reason of general roughness of the game or difficulty of administering it.

    42

    521*521 Indeed, the evidence shows that there are rules of the game which prohibit the intentional striking of blows. Thus, Article 1, Item 1, Subsection C, provides that:

    43
    All players are prohibited from striking on the head, face or neck with the heel, back or side of the hand, wrist, forearm, elbow or clasped hands.
    44

    Thus the very conduct which was present here is expressly prohibited by the rule which is quoted above.

    45

    The general customs of football do not approve the intentional punching or striking of others. That this is prohibited was supported by the testimony of all of the witnesses. They testified that the intentional striking of a player in the face or from the rear is prohibited by the playing rules as well as the general customs of the game. Punching or hitting with the arms is prohibited. Undoubtedly these restraints are intended to establish reasonable boundaries so that one football player cannot intentionally inflict a serious injury on another. Therefore, the notion is not correct that all reason has been abandoned, whereby the only possible remedy for the person who has been the victim of an unlawful blow is retaliation.

    47
    IV.

    49
    WAS IT LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HOLD, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THAT JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT AROSE OUT OF A PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL GAME?

    51
    A. Whether the theory of judicial restraint applies.
    52

    It is a well-settled principle of federal jurisdiction that where a federal court does not have a discretion to accept or reject jurisdiction, if it does not have jurisdiction, it will not take it; but it is ruled, on the other hand, that if it has jurisdiction it must take it. This principle has been expressed many times with perhaps one of the best expressions being found in an early opinion, that of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821):

    53
    It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. In doing this, on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one.
    54

    Much more recently the Supreme Court in the case of Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40, 29 S.Ct. 192, 195, 53 L.Ed. 382 (1909), speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, stated that where a federal court is appealed to in the case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.

    55
    They assume to criticise that court [United States District Court for the Southern District of New York] for taking jurisdiction of this case, as precipitate, as if it were a question of discretion or comity, whether or not that court should have heard the case. On the contrary, there was no discretion or comity about it. When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction (Cohens v. Virginia, [19 U.S. 264,] 6 Wheat., 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257), and, in taking it, that court cannot be truthfully spoken of as precipitate in its conduct. 522*522 That the case may be one of local interest only is entirely immaterial, so long as the parties are citizens of different States or a question is involved which by law brings the case within the jurisdiction of a Federal court. The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied.
    56

    Mr. Justice Peckham expressed the view that the rule is based on the right of a party plaintiff to choose a federal court where there is a choice.

    57

    There are some recognized limitations on federal courts assuming jurisdiction, but none of these permit a court to exercise its own discretion on the subject. One example of limitation is the political question. Another is the doctrine of abstention, which is exercised where a state court is involved and deference is exercised in favor of the state court. See, for example, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). These, however, are the exceptions and not the rule as was pointed out in the cited case. Abstention itself is limited. It does not contemplate that federal courts abdicate their jurisdiction. See American Trial Lawyers Association v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 93 S.Ct. 627, 34 L.Ed.2d 651 (1973).

    58

    The Supreme Court has been known to refuse to exercise its original jurisdiction. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation, 401 U.S. 493, 91 S.Ct. 1005, 28 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). At the same time, it reiterated the traditional rule that where a federal court has jurisdiction it must exercise it. It is not at liberty to refuse to do so unless it is in accordance with one of the principles mentioned above. Original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court allows much more leeway to refusing acceptance of jurisdiction than does an inferior federal court.

    59

    It is clear that none of the grounds for refusing access to the courts are present in the instant case. One writer, Professor Keeton, has said that courts properly participate in the evolution and development of common law. We submit that this approach is at odds with refusing to accept the case. See Keeton, Creative Continuity of Tort Law, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 463 (1962). See also Widener, Some Random Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 31 Wn. and Lee L.Rev. 505 (1974).[1]

    60

    The spirit and the letter of the decisions are that if jurisdiction to hear or determine cases exists, as it does in the case at bar, the cause is to be tried on its merits.

    61

    The position which was adopted by the trial court in this case was then directly contrary to all of the law dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts.

    63
    B. Whether diversity jurisdiction provides any discretion.
    64

    It is of high importance to note the fact that in a diversity of citizenship case the federal district court sits as a state trial court and applies the law of the forum state. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In this highly important decision the Supreme Court, through the late Justice Brandeis, overruled the early case of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), which had allowed federal trial courts to apply their own common law. The rule was established in Erie that the law of the state in which the court sat had to be applied to the diversity case. In rejecting the principle that the federal court could apply its own common law rule, the Court rejected the idea that a transcendental body of law existed for federal courts. It was said that there was no backup federal authority in the federal government to provide this power for federal courts; that the authoritative governing force was in the state courts.

    65

    523*523 Justice Holmes was quoted by Justice Brandeis (the author of Erie) for the proposition that the authority in this diversity area must come from the state. A second basis for disapproval of federal authority or ability to innovate in diversity cases also originated with Justice Holmes, who said that the Swift v. Tyson rule was an unconstitutional assumption of power by the courts of the United States. The Supreme Court in Erie thus declared that in applying the theory of Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had invaded rights protected by the Constitution of the United States and the several states.

    66

    So, applying the Erie doctrine, the conclusion is that there does not exist an independent basis which allows a federal court to, in effect, outlaw a particular activity absent legal evidence that either state policy or state law dictates or allows such action. Absent any such evidence, the trial court cannot turn to public policy in order to support a conclusion that the courts cannot entertain a particular case.

    67

    Second, it is also fundamental that for every injury wrongfully inflicted, some redress under the state common law must be afforded since it is essential that citizens be able to look to their government for redress. As was said in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the law, whenever he received an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."

    68

    The right of citizens to get relief in federal courts is similar to the same right in state court, bearing in mind that the federal courts in diversity cases are applying state law. We must also be cognizant that federal courts are limited to deciding cases or controversies. This was pointed out in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The Court there said:

    69
    those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
    70

    392 U.S. at 95, 88 S.Ct. at 1950.

    71

    The Court in Flast was recognizing the right of a federal taxpayer to enjoin the spending of federal funds for the buying of books for use in religious schools. 392 U.S. at 105-06, 88 S.Ct. 1942.

    72

    The concurrence of Justice Douglas is worth noting, for he spoke on the right of access to the courts as follows:

    73
    The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our federal system. With the growing complexities of government it is often the one and only place where effective relief can be obtained. If the judiciary were to become a super-legislative group sitting in judgment on the affairs of people, the situation would be intolerable. But where wrongs to individuals are done by violation of specific guarantees, it is abdication for the courts to close their doors.
    74

    392 U.S. at 111, 88 S.Ct. at 1958.

    76
    C. Does Colorado law provide or allow any restraint?
    77

    The next question is whether there are applicable restrictions in the Colorado law. On the contrary, the Colorado Constitution, Art. II, § 6, provides: "Court of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay." The district courts are said to be courts of unlimited jurisdiction unlike the federal courts. However, in a diversity case the federal court inherits the jurisdictional scope that is enjoyed by the state court within the district. Art. VI, § 9, subsection (1), provides:

    78
    The district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil, 524*524 probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.
    79

    The Colorado courts have liberally construed these provisions. See Patterson v. People, 23 Colo. App. 479, 130 P. 618 (1913); People ex rel. Cruz v. Morley, 77 Colo. 25, 234 P. 178 (1924). In the Morley case it was said: "[t]he constitutional jurisdiction of the district court is unlimited. It should not be limited without circumspection and no statute should be held to limit it unless it says so plainly * * *." 234 P. at 179.

    80

    The Colorado Supreme Court has held that under Art. II, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution, where there exists a right under the law, the courts of the state will assure the protection of that right. O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344 (1972).

    81

    The common law, of course, obtains in Colorado. The legislature may modify it, but in the absence of evidence that the common law has been modified by legislation, the courts, that is, the district court and the federal district court in a diversity case, must apply it.

    82

    We are constrained to hold that the trial court's ruling that this case had to be dismissed because the injury was inflicted during a professional football game was error.

    84
    V.

    86
    IS THE STANDARD OF RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION?
    87

    The Restatement of Torts Second, § 500, distinguishes between reckless and negligent misconduct. Reckless misconduct differs from negligence, according to the authors, in that negligence consists of mere inadvertence, lack of skillfulness or failure to take precautions; reckless misconduct, on the other hand, involves a choice or adoption of a course of action either with knowledge of the danger or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to a reasonable man. Recklessness also differs in that it consists of intentionally doing an act with knowledge not only that it contains a risk of harm to others as does negligence, but that it actually involves a risk substantially greater in magnitude than is necessary in the case of negligence. The authors explain the difference, therefore, in the degree of risk by saying that the difference is so significant as to amount to a difference in kind.

    88

    Subsection (f) also distinguishes between reckless misconduct and intentional wrongdoing. To be reckless the act must have been intended by the actor. At the same time, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realized, or from the facts should have realized, that there was a strong probability that harm would result even though he may hope or expect that this conduct will prove harmless. Nevertheless, existence of probability is different from substantial certainty which is an ingredient of intent to cause the harm which results from the act.

    89

    Therefore, recklessness exists where a person knows that the act is harmful but fails to realize that it will produce the extreme harm which it did produce. It is in this respect that recklessness and intentional conduct differ in degree.

    90

    In the case at bar the defendant Clark admittedly acted impulsively and in the heat of anger, and even though it could be said from the admitted facts that he intended the act, it could also be said that he did not intend to inflict serious injury which resulted from the blow which he struck.

    91

    In ruling that recklessness is the appropriate standard and that assault and battery is not the exclusive one, we are saying that these two liability concepts are not necessarily opposed one to the other. Rather, recklessness under § 500 of the Restatement might be regarded, for the purpose of analysis at least, a lesser included act.

    92

    525*525 Assault and battery, having originated in a common law writ, is narrower than recklessness in its scope. In essence, two definitions enter into it. The assault is an attempt coupled with the present ability to commit a violent harm against another. Battery is the unprivileged or unlawful touching of another. Assault and battery then call for an intent, as does recklessness. But in recklessness the intent is to do the act, but without an intent to cause the particular harm. It is enough if the actor knows that there is a strong probability that harm will result. Thus, the definition fits perfectly the fact situation here. Surely, then, no reason exists to compel appellant to employ the assault and battery standard which does not comfortably apply fully in preference to the standard which meets this fact situation.

    94
    VI.

    96
    WHICH OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES?
    97

    The appellees contend that Clark was guilty of an assault and battery, if he was guilty of anything; that this is barred by the applicable statute of limitations for a one-year period. Appellant, however, contends that the injury was the result of reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff and that the six-year statute provided in Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-80-110, is applicable.

    98

    Our court in the recent decision in Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir.1978), adopted the position that actions in tort are governed by the six-year provision in the cited statute. It is also to be noted that Colorado fully recognizes the action of reckless disregard for the rights of others. See Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954); Fanstiel v. Wright, 122 Colo. 451, 222 P.2d 1001 (1950); Shoemaker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 559 P.2d 721 (Colo.App. 1976). The definitions contained in § 500 are fully applicable here, and the Colorado Supreme Court in Fanstiel v. Wright, supra, has adopted the definition contained in § 500. A Comment to the section discusses the distinctions which we have previously mentioned.

    99

    We conclude that if the evidence establishes that the injuries were the result of acts of Clark which were in reckless disregard of Hackbart's safety, it can be said that he established a claim which is subject to the six-year statute. The cause has not been tried on its merits, but there is substantial evidence before us that supports the notion that Clark did act in accordance with the tests and standards which are set forth in § 500, supra. We are not prejudging this issue of fact, but are merely saying that considered in a light favorable to the plaintiff, at this stage of the proceedings the hypothesis exists that Clark's conduct would constitute a violation of § 500 and the appellant should be given an opportunity to offer his proofs in court on this subject.

    101
    VII.

    103
    DID THE COURT ERR IN RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE FILMS OF VIOLENCE THAT TOOK PLACE IN OTHER FOOTBALL GAMES REGARDLESS OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PLAYERS AND TEAMS?
    104

    There was a film of the actual injury suffered by plaintiff. It showed the sequence of events and also depicted the manner of infliction. Obviously we need not consider the relevancy of this.

    105

    There were incidents that were designed to show that the plaintiff Hackbart was a dirty player.

    106

    Finally, films were shown which depicted acts of violence between other players and other teams.

    107

    The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 401, define relevant evidence as follows:

    108
    "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
    109

    526*526 Rule 404 deals with character evidence and other crimes. That which deals with character states as follows:

    110
    (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
    111
    (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
    112
    (2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
    113
    (3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
    114

    Subsection (b) of Rule 404 deals with other wrongs or acts and states the traditional rule that:

    115
    (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
    116

    Unless the game of football is on trial, and it appeared to be in the case at bar, the acts of violence which occurred in other games and between other teams and players were without relevance. The view we take is that the game of football is not on trial, but, rather, the trial involves a particular act in one game.

    117

    Although we recognize that the trial court has a broad discretion in receiving or rejecting evidence along this line, we fail to see the relevancy of other acts which are unconnected with the incident being tried.

    118

    The other aspect, namely the proof of the character of the plaintiff by production of prior acts, would be admissible only if his character was an issue in the case. Unless the plaintiff was shown to have been an unlawful aggressor in the immediate incident, his prior acts could not be relevant. The indications from the picture of the action here are that he threw a body block and after the lapse of some time, a short period of time, the blow was struck while Hackbart was down on his knee watching the action. Therefore, this evidence would appear to be questionable if not irrelevant.

    119

    On retrial the admissibility of prior unrelated acts should be very carefully considered and should not be received merely for the purpose of showing that the defendant himself had violated rules in times past since this is not per se relevant. Indeed it would be necessary for an issue to exist as to whether Hackbart was the aggressor in order for such evidence to be relevant.

    121
    * * * * * *
    122

    In sum, having concluded that the trial court did not limit the case to a trial of the evidence bearing on defendant's liability but rather determined that as a matter of social policy the game was so violent and unlawful that valid lines could not be drawn, we take the view that this was not a proper issue for determination and that plaintiff was entitled to have the case tried on an assessment of his rights and whether they had been violated.

    123

    The trial court has heard the evidence and has made findings. The findings of fact based on the evidence presented are not an issue on this appeal. Thus, it would not seem that the court would have to repeat the areas of evidence that have already been fully considered. The need is for a reconsideration of that evidence in the light of that which is taken up by this court in its opinion. We are not to be understood as limiting the trial court's consideration of supplemental evidence if it deems it necessary.

    124

    527*527 The cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with the foregoing views.

    126

    [1] Judge Widener of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that if a problem exists it "is not to say that the federal courts must avoid all the hard, or unpleasant, or distasteful questions," but rather the limitations should be on the basis that jurisdiction prohibits the acceptance of the case. Since Congress prescribed jurisdiction, the boundaries set by it should be followed.

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