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Actus reus, or the act requirement, is the first part of culpability in criminal law. (You will meet the second part, mens rea, in the next section.) In short, almost every crime must have an act, but defining that act can be tricky. Sometimes something that seems like an act isn’t an act; other times, something that does not seem like an act is one.
These cases introduce you to the act requirement. Notice distinctions between voluntary and involuntary acts, and between conduct and the results of conduct. Consider why the court reaches the decision it does in each case, and what its decision says about its concept of blameworthiness.
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MAKE ALL NOTES PUBLIC (3/4 playlist item notes are public) MAKE ALL NOTES PRIVATE (1/4 playlist item notes are private)1 | Show/Hide More | Martin v. State |
2 | Show/Hide More | People v. Decina |
3 | Show/Hide More | People v. Newton |
4 | Show/Hide More | II.B.i Acts v. Omissions |
When is not acting an act?
One of the most fraught distinctions in criminal law has been the act/omission distinction. For most people, punishing inaction in certain situations seems to flow naturally out of the sense of blameworthiness that underpins much of criminal law. However, defining the criminal act when it is not an act raises problems.
As a general rule, there is no criminal liability for omissions. The following cases and readings consider the exceptions to this rule, whether they arise from statutorily created duties, special moral relationships, contractual relationships, or the voluntary assumption of responsibilities. As you will see, in some cases, criminalizing omissions likely tracks your moral intuitions. In others, you may feel more conflicted. Consider why different scenarios imply different levels of blameworthiness, but also what goals or behaviors society may seek to promote by assigning affirmative duties to act.
4.1 | Show/Hide More | Pope v. State |
4.2 | Show/Hide More | People v. Stephens |
4.3 | Show/Hide More | People v. Beardsley |
4.5 | Show/Hide More | Vermont Duty to Aid the Endangered Act |
December 12, 2016
Tim Wu
Professor
Columbia Law School
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