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In today's class, we will continue our discussion of Presidential spending powers, starting first with the topic of line item vetos, which came before the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York 524 U.S. 417 (1998). We will then review the topic of reprogramming, which is explored in some detail in Takeshi Fujitani & Jared Shirck, “Executive Spending Powers: The Capacity to Reprogram, Rescind, and Impound” (May 3, 2005) (Briefing Paper No. 8). Team Assignment (Teams B & F):
Please prepare a few powerpoint slides assessing whether the practices for reprogramming comport with the constitutional standards articulated in the Clinton v. City of New York decision as well as other separation-of-powers cases we’ve encountered in this course. For background reading, Briefing Papers Number 12 and Number 60 explores another area in which executive actions can trigger federal spending without direct congressional oversight.
Finally, as further background, Briefing Paper No. 3 explores the use of line item vetos at the State Level.EDIT PLAYLIST INFORMATION DELETE PLAYLIST
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January 09, 2017
Howell E. Jackson
James S. Reid, Jr. Professor of Law
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