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|1.1.1||Show/Hide More||Introduction from Friedenthal Miller et al, Civil Procedure (10th ed. 2012)|
|1.3||Show/Hide More||Simple (?) Introductory Case|
|2||Show/Hide More||The Basics of Pleading and Rule 11|
|2.1||Show/Hide More||The "old" Days: Pre-FRCP|
|2.2||Show/Hide More||Pleading Basics in the FRCP system|
|2.3||Show/Hide More||Responding to the Complaint by Answer (possibly followed by Reply)|
|2.4||Show/Hide More||Rule 11 and the Truthfulness of Pleadings|
|2.4.2||Show/Hide More||"Sanctions” materials from Subrin, Minow et al., [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
|3||Show/Hide More||Preliminaries 1: Notice, Service of Process, Opportunity to be Heard|
|3.1.1||Show/Hide More||Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. [NOTE COMMENT]|
|3.2||Show/Hide More||III.B. Service of Process|
|3.3||Show/Hide More||Opportunity To Be Heard|
|3.3.1||Show/Hide More||Deprivations by the State|
|3.3.2||Show/Hide More||Deprivation by "Private" Individuals|
|188.8.131.52||Show/Hide More||Shaumyan v. O'Neill [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
[SKIM THIS – We won't spend a lot of time on it.]
Did the statute in Doehr die after the Supreme Court decision? Not quite . . . .
This case involved a fight between a homeowner and contractor hired to do repairs. When the homeowner was not happy with the quality of the work he would not pay. The contractor retaliated by getting an ex parte prejudgment attachment of the owner's home. While that state case was pending, the homeowner sued in FEDERAL court to block the application of the attachment statute as unconstitutional after Doehr.
How did the Second Circuit court of appeals rule? Was this case distinguishable?
|3.3.3||Show/Hide More||Contemporary Application: Enemy Combatants and Others|
|184.108.40.206||The No-Fly List Problem|
|3.3.4||Show/Hide More||Introduction to Remedies: Preliminary Injunctions and TROs|
|4||Show/Hide More||Preliminaries 2: Subject Matter Jurisdiction|
|4.2||Show/Hide More||Introduction to Subject Matter Jurisdiction|
|4.3||Show/Hide More||Diversity Jurisdiction|
|4.4||Show/Hide More||Federal Question|
|4.4.1||Show/Hide More||The Theory and the Constitutional Grant|
|220.127.116.11||Show/Hide More||Osborn v. Bank of United States [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
NOTE: This case is complicated. I have endeavored to edit it such that it most closely resembles contemporary English but in some instances that was not possible. Have patience when reading it and do not spend more than 20 minutes on it.
SUMMARY OF FACTS: The Bank of the United States brought suit against the state auditor of Ohio (Osborn) in federal court seeking an injunction to stop Ohio from collecting a tax the Bank believed was unconstitutional. Historically, the States opposed the Bank of the United States and often levied punitive taxes against it. Even though the court granted the Bank a temporary injunction, the state auditor forcibly entered the bank and took the money he claimed state was owed. The court ordered the state officials to return the money, who in response argued that the federal courts had no subject matter jurisdiction.
|4.4.2||Show/Hide More||The Statutory Grant|
|4.4.3||Show/Hide More||The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule|
|18.104.22.168||Show/Hide More||Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. [OPTIONAL AS SUMMARIZED IN CHEAT SHEAT]|
|22.214.171.124||Show/Hide More||Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. [OPTIONAL AS SUMMARIZED IN CHEAT SHEAT]|
|126.96.36.199||Show/Hide More||Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum Inc. [OPTIONAL AS SUMMARIZED IN CHEAT SHEAT]|
|4.4.4||Show/Hide More||The Meaning of "arising under"|
|188.8.131.52||Show/Hide More||Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
|184.108.40.206||Show/Hide More||Gunn v. Minton [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
Summary/Edited Facts of Case:
Vernon Minton developed a computer program (“TEXCEN”) for securities trading in the early 1990s. He leased it in 1995 to a securities brokerage. He applied to patent TEXCEN a little more than a year later, and the patent was issued in 2000.
Minton then sued NASDAQ for patent infringement, represented by Mr. Gunn. NASDAQ obtained summary judgment on the grounds that the patent was invalid; an inventor is not entitled to a patent if “the invention was . . . on sale . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application,” and Minton had leased TEXCEN to Stark more than one year prior to filing his patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Minton then filed a motion for reconsideration arguing for the first time that the lease agreement was part of ongoing testing of TEXCEN and therefore fell within the “experimental use” exception to the [one year rule]. The District Court denied the motion on the grounds that the experimental use argument was waived, Minton appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
|220.127.116.11||Show/Hide More||Additional, OPTIONAL Cases [Read if interested]|
|4.5||Show/Hide More||Supplemental Jurisdiction|
|4.5.1||Show/Hide More||How We Got Here|
|18.104.22.168||Show/Hide More||A Note on Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Following Gibbs, from Friedenthal, Miller, et al (10th ed. 2012) [NOTE DIRECTIONS]|
|4.5.2||Show/Hide More||The Current State of the Law|
|22.214.171.124||Show/Hide More||Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co. [NOTE COMMENT]|
|126.96.36.199||Show/Hide More||OPTIONAL: T&O v. CNOF [OPTIONAL, READ ONLY IF YOU WANT TO]|
|5||Show/Hide More||Preliminaries 3: Personal Jurisdiction|
|5.2||Show/Hide More||Traditional Bases|
|5.2.1||Introduction to Pennoyer|
|5.3||Show/Hide More||The Modern Doctrine and the Constitutional Limits of Due Process|
|5.4||Show/Hide More||Introduction to Long Arm Statutes: State Long Arms|
|5.5||Show/Hide More||Development of General In Personam Jurisdiction|
|5.6||Show/Hide More||More on Specific in Personam Jurisdiction|