European Court of Human Rights (ECtHr), Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310(71) (1978), excerpt | Samuel Moyn | August 01, 2016


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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHr), Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310(71) (1978), excerpt

European Court of Human Rights
Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (1978)



11. The tragic and lasting crisis in Northern Ireland lies at the root of the present case. In order to combat what the respondent Government describe as "the longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in either part of the island of Ireland", the authorities in Northern Ireland exercised from August 1971 until December 1975 a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment. The proceedings in this case concern the scope and the operation in practice of those measures as well as the alleged ill-treatment of persons thereby deprived of their liberty.

12. Up to March 1975, on the figures cited before the Commission by the respondent Government, over 1,100 people had been killed, over 11,500 injured and more than £140,000,000 worth of property destroyed during the recent troubles in Northern Ireland. This violence found its expression in part in civil disorders, in part in terrorism, that is organised violence for political ends….

C. Situation from 1970 until the introduction of internment on 9 august 1971

29. The situation worsened in 1970. The number of explosions recorded by the police jumped dramatically from a total of 8 in 1969 to 155 in 1970. Some explosions were caused by Loyalists - about 25 according to statistics cited by the Commission - but there is no dispute that the majority were the work of the IRA. In total, 23 civilians and 2 policemen were killed during the course of the year. None of these deaths was attributed by the police to Protestant activity.

30. The terrorist campaign by the IRA appears to have begun in earnest in 1970 and to have been one primarily of bombing buildings and attacking the security forces. There was also undoubtedly some terrorist activity on the part of Loyalists, directed largely against politicians seen as hostile to Unionism and against Catholic owned or occupied property, particularly licensed premises. Responsibility for certain explosions was in fact claimed by the UVF.

31. The sharp increase in what may be termed terrorist-type activity was not accompanied by the cessation of inter-communal street disturbances which continued sporadically during the year of 1970 and accounted for the deaths of a number of people.

32. Between January and July 1971, the violence intensified, being marked by a dramatic upsurge in terrorist activity by the IRA. Police statistics record a total of 304 explosions, including 94 for the one month of July. Shooting at the security forces’ patrols built up and for the first time soldiers numbered amongst those killed. By 9 August, 13 soldiers, 2 policemen and 16 civilians had died since the beginning of the year. In addition, serious and prolonged rioting occurred in both Catholic and Protestant areas.
Apart from one explosion in which a civilian was killed, there is no evidence of any deaths or even injuries having been caused by Loyalist terrorists. On the applicant Government’s own approximate estimate, Loyalist explosions accounted for only 14 out of the overall total of 304. Furthermore, as in 1970, Loyalist terrorists used mainly pipe bombs which were not very powerful in comparison with the devices employed by the IRA.
The Commission stated in its report that the IRA were indisputably responsible for the very great majority of the acts of violence during this period. Loyalist terrorist activity had declined; there is no evidence that such Loyalist terrorism as did exist formed part of a highly organised campaign in the sense that IRA activity did. The Commission’s conclusion was that the threat and reality of serious terrorism came almost exclusively from the IRA.

33. On the political front during 1970 and 1971, progress was made in implementing the reforms announced in October 1969 (see paragraph 26 above). The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, however, resigned in March 1971. In June 1971, his successor proposed a number of further steps designed to provide a positive role for representatives of the minority community in the actual process of government.

D. 9 August 1971 (introduction of internment) until 30 March 1972 (introduction of direct rule)

1.The decision to introduce internment
34. It was against the background outlined above that on 9 August 1971 the Northern Ireland Government brought into operation extrajudicial measures of detention and internment of suspected terrorists. From 9 August 1971 until 7 November 1972, when certain of the Special Powers Regulations were replaced, the authorities in Northern Ireland in fact exercised four such extrajudicial powers: (i) arrest for interrogation purposes during 48 hours (under Regulation 10); (ii) arrest and remand in custody (under Regulation 11 (1)); (iii) detention of an arrested person (under Regulation 11 (2)); and (iv) internment (under Regulation 12 (1)). An account of the operation of these powers and the procedures there under is given below at paragraphs 81 to 84….

2. Reasons for the decision to introduce internment
36. The campaign of violence carried out by the IRA had attained unprecedented proportions by the middle of 1971. This was clearly the dominant factor behind the decision to exercise the extrajudicial powers.
Three principal reasons for the decision have been cited by the respondent Government. Firstly, the authorities took the view that the normal procedures of investigation and criminal prosecution had become inadequate to deal with IRA terrorists; it was considered that the ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole process of law for restoring peace and order. The second reason given, which was closely related to the first, was the widespread intimidation of the population. Such intimidation often made it impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a criminal conviction against a known IRA terrorist in the absence of an admissible confession or of police or army testimony. Furthermore, the conduct of police enquiries was seriously hampered by the grip the IRA had on certain so-called "no-go" areas, that is Catholic strongholds where terrorists, unlike the police, could operate in comparative safety. Thirdly, the ease of escape across the territorial border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland presented difficulties of control.
In addition to the three "security" reasons, there was, in the judgment of both the Northern Ireland Government and the United Kingdom Government, no hope of winning over the terrorists by political means, the reform programme initiated in 1969 having failed to prevent continuing violence.
The authorities therefore came to the conclusion that it was necessary to introduce a policy of detention and internment of persons suspected of serious terrorist activities but against whom sufficient evidence could not be laid in court. This policy was regarded as a temporary measure primarily aimed at breaking the influence of the IRA. It was intended that a respite would be provided so as to enable the political and social reforms already undertaken to achieve their full effects….

A. The special powers act and regulations there under
1. Arrest under Regulation 10
81. Under this Regulation
- any individual could be arrested without warrant and detained for the purpose of interrogation;
- the arrest could be authorised by any officer of the RUC;
- the officer had to be of the opinion that the arrest should be realised "for the preservation of the peace and maintenance of order";
- the detention could not exceed forty-eight hours.
Exercise of the power was not conditional on suspicion of an offence and, following a practice originating in instructions issued to the military police in May 1970, the individual was not normally informed of the reason for his arrest. Although looked upon in principle as a preliminary to detention and internment (see paragraphs 83 and 84 below), arrest sometimes had the object of interrogating a person about the activities of others. Some arrests, and some subsequent detention orders, seem to have been made on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information.
The individual could not apply for bail (see the judgment of 12 October 1971 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland in the case of In Re McElduff). Moreover, arrests under this Regulation could not as a general rule be questioned in the courts but it was held in the judgment of 18 February 1972 delivered by the Armagh County Court in the case of Moore v. Shillington and Ministry of Defence that failure to comply with the proper procedure, including certain fundamental principles of the common law, invalidated exercise of the power.
On 8 August 1973 the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below) repealed Regulation 10. 2,937 persons had been arrested there under prior to 30 March 1972, of whom 1,711 had been released within forty-eight hours and 1,226 had had their detention prolonged under other Regulations.

2. Arrest under Regulation 11 (1)
82. Under this Regulation
- any individual could be arrested without warrant;
- the arrest could be effected by any police constable, member of the forces or person authorised by the "Civil Authority" (i.e. the Minister of Home Affairs or his delegates);
- the person making the arrest had to suspect the individual of acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order or of having committed an offence against the Regulations;
- the duration of the arrest was unlimited in law but limited in practice to seventy-two hours.
Arrest under this Regulation could follow arrest under Regulation 10, giving a total of at most one hundred and twenty hours. The individual was not normally informed of the reason for his arrest.
Judicial decisions show that review by the courts of the exercise of this power was limited. They could intervene if there had been bad faith, absence of a genuine suspicion, improper motive or failure to comply either with the statutory procedures or with such principles of the common law as were held not to be excluded by the language of the Regulation; however, they could not in general enquire into the reasonableness or fairness of the suspicion or of the decision to exercise the power (see the McElduff case and the judgment of 11 January 1973 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland in the case of Kelly v. Faulkner and others).
Under Regulation 11 (4), the individual could apply to the Civil Authority for release on bail and, if that Authority so directed, might be conditionally discharged from custody by a magistrate; however, this right was abolished on 7 November 1972 with the revocation of Regulation 11 (4) by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below).
Regulation 11 (1) was repealed on 8 August 1973 by the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below).

3. Detention under Regulation 11 (2)
83. Under this Regulation
- any individual arrested under Regulation 11 (1) could be detained in prison or elsewhere on the conditions directed by the Civil Authority;
- the power to make detention orders was vested in the Civil Authority and the initiative for them came from the police. The respondent Government said that they were always made on the personal decision, before direct rule, of the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland or, thereafter, of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or two other Ministers;
- detention continued until the individual was discharged by the Attorney-General or brought before a court. Its duration was unlimited in law but limited in practice, generally, to twenty-eight days.
The respondent Government said that detention orders were made to enable the police to complete enquiries. If they had sufficient evidence to secure a conviction, the individual would be brought before an ordinary court in which event he was entitled to at least twenty-four hours’ notice of the charge. Alternatively, he might be released after a limited period or be the subject of an internment order (see paragraph 84 below).
The detainee had the limited right to apply for bail afforded by Regulation 11 (4) (see paragraph 82 above). The position concerning supervision by the courts was the same as under Regulations 10 and 11 (1) (see the McElduff and the Kelly cases) and there was no other procedure for review of the detention.
More than 1,250 detention orders were made under Regulation 11 (2), the vast majority before 30 March 1972. Nearly 120 orders were still in force on 7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below).

4. Internment under Regulation 12 (1)
84. Under this Regulation
- any individual could by order be subjected to restrictions on movement or interned;
- the power to make such orders was vested before direct rule in the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland on the recommendation of a senior police officer or of an advisory committee. The respondent Government said that they were always made on the personal decision of the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland;
- the Minister had to be satisfied that for securing the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order it was expedient that a person suspected of acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial te peace and order be subjected to such restrictions or interned;
- the duration of internment was unlimited. In many cases, after prolongation under later legislation (see paragraphs 85 and 88 below), it lasted for some years.
Every order had to provide for the consideration by and advisory committee of representations made by the individual. In fact it reviewed the position of all internees whether they made representations or not. The committee composed of a judge and two laymen, could recommend, but not order, release.
The individual had no right in law to appear or be legally represented before the committee, to test the grounds for internment, to examine witnesses against him or to call his own witnesses. In fact, he was allowed to appear and be interviewed and every effort was made to trace witnesses he proposed. The committee required the security forces to produce the information in their possession but statements of evidence against the internee so obtained remained anonymous, apparently to avoid retaliation. According to the Commission, the committee probably relied on evidence not admissible in a court of law.
The position concerning the review of internment orders by the courts was the same as under Regulations 10, 11 (1) and 11 (2) (see the Kelly case).
796 orders were made under Regulation 12 (1), all before the introduction of direct rule. Nearly 170 orders were still in force on 7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below).
By 30 March 1972, 588 of the 796 cases had been reviewed by the advisory committee (although 451 internees refused to appear) and 69 releases recommended. Of the 69 individuals all were released except 6 who refused to give an undertaking as to future good behaviour.

B. On Article 5 taken together with Article 15 (art. 15+5)
202. The applicant Government maintain that the powers relating to extrajudicial deprivation of liberty which were applied in Northern Ireland from 9 August 1971 to March 1975 were not in complete conformity with Article 15 (art. 15) and, accordingly, violated Article 5 (art. 5).
The Commission is unanimous in not accepting this claim and it is disputed by the respondent Government.

203. Article 15 (art. 15) provides:
"1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
No derogation from Article 2 (art. 2), except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 (art. 3, art. 4-1, art. 7) shall be made under this provision.
Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed."

204. Article 5 (art. 5) does not appear amongst the entrenched provisions listed in paragraph 2 of Article 15 (art. 15-2) and is therefore one of the Articles subject to the "right of derogation" reserved by the Contracting States, the exercise of which is regulated by paragraphs 1 and 3 (art. 15-1, art. 15-3).

1. On the "public emergency threatening the life of the nation"
205. Article 15 (art. 15) comes into play only "in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation". The existence of such an emergency is perfectly clear from the facts summarised above (paragraphs 12 and 29-75) and was not questioned by anyone before either the Commission or the Court. The crisis experienced at the time by the six counties therefore comes within the ambit of Article 15 (art. 15).

2. On the "extent strictly required"
206. The Contracting States may make use of their right of derogation only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". The Irish Government consider the "extent strictly required" to have been exceeded, whereas the British Government and the Commission assert the contrary.
(a) The role of the Court
207. The limits on the Court’s powers of review (see judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits of the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 35, para. 10 in fine; Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 22, para. 48) are particularly apparent where Article 15 (art. 15) is concerned.
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for "the life of [its] nation", to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) leaves those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of the States’ engagements (Article 19) (art. 19), is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies" of the crisis (Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, p. 55, para. 22, and pp. 57-59, paras. 36-38). The domestic margin of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision.
(c) Questions concerning the merits
211. The Court has to decide whether the United Kingdom went beyond the "extent strictly required". For this purpose the Court must, as in the Lawless case (judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, pp. 57-59, paras. 36-37), enquire into the necessity for, on the one hand, deprivation of liberty contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 5 (art. 5-1) and, on the other hand, the failure of guarantees to attain the level fixed by paragraphs 2 to 4 (art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4).

(i) On the necessity for derogation from paragraph 1 of Article 5 (art. 5-1) by extrajudicial deprivation of liberty
212. Unquestionably, the exercise of the special powers was mainly, and before 5 February 1973 even exclusively, directed against the IRA as an underground military force. The intention was to combat an organisation which had played a considerable subversive role throughout the recent history of Ireland and which was creating, in August 1971 and thereafter, a particularly far-reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties and the lives of the province’s inhabitants (see paragraphs 16, 17, 20, 28-32, 35-42, 44, 47-48, 54-55, 58, 61, 63 and 67 above). Being confronted with a massive wave of violence and intimidation, the Northern Ireland Government and then, after the introduction of direct rule (30 March 1972), the British Government were reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation offered insufficient resources for the campaign against terrorism and that recourse to measures outside the scope of the ordinary law, in the shape of extrajudicial deprivation of liberty, was called for. When the Irish Republic was faced with a serious crisis in 1957, it adopted the same approach and the Court did not conclude that the "extent strictly required" had been exceeded (Lawless judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, pp. 35-36, para. 14, and pp. 57-58, para. 36).
However, under one of the provisions complained of, namely Regulation 10, a person who was in no way suspected of a crime or offence or of activities prejudicial to peace and order could be arrested for the sole purpose of obtaining from him information about others - and this sometimes occurred (see paragraphs 38 and 81 above). This sort of arrest can be justifiable only in a very exceptional situation, but the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland did fall into such a category. Many witnesses could not give evidence freely without running the greatest risks (see paragraphs 36, 53, 58-59 and 74 above); the competent authorities were entitled to take the view, without exceeding their margin of appreciation, that it was indispensable to arrest such witnesses so that they could be questioned in conditions of relative security and not be exposed to reprisals. Moreover and above all, Regulation 10 authorised deprivation of liberty only for a maximum of forty-eight hours.

213. From 9 August 1971 to 5 February 1973, the measures involving deprivation of liberty taken by the respondent State were used only against Republican terrorism even though as early as this period outrages, at first sporadic but later constantly more numerous, were attributable to Loyalist terrorism; even after 5 February 1973, the measures were applied against Republican terrorism to a much greater extent than against Loyalist terrorism despite the latter’s organisation and extensive development shortly after 30 March 1972.
The Court will examine below (paragraphs 228-232) whether the difference of treatment between the two types of terrorism was such as to violate Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.
This issue apart, it appears to the Court that the extrajudicial measures brought into operation could, in the situation described above, reasonably have been considered strictly required for the protection of public security and that, in the context of Article 15 (art. 15), their intrinsic necessity, once recognised, could not be affected by the restriction of their field of application.
214. The Irish Government submit that experience shows extrajudicial deprivation of liberty to have been ineffectual. They contend that the policy introduced on 9 August 1971 not only failed to put a brake on terrorism but also had the result of increasing it (see paragraphs 42, 44 and 47-48 above). Consequently, the British Government, after attenuating the policy in varying degrees following the introduction of direct rule (see paragraphs 50, 57 and 64 above), abandoned it on 5 December 1975: since then, it appears that no one has been detained in the six counties under the emergency legislation, despite the persistence of an intense campaign of violence and even though the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act has remained in force (see paragraphs 76 and 91 above). This, claim the applicant Government, confirms that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was not an absolute necessity.
The Court cannot accept this argument.
It is certainly not the Court’s function to substitute for the British Government’s assessment any other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism. The Court must do no more than review the lawfulness, under the Convention, of the measures adopted by that Government from 9 August 1971 onwards. For this purpose the Court must arrive at its decision in the light, not of a purely retrospective examination of the efficacy of those measures, but of the conditions and circumstances reigning when they were originally taken and subsequently applied.
Adopting, as it must, this approach, the Court accepts that the limits of the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States by Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1) were not overstepped by the United Kingdom when it formed the opinion that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was necessary from August 1971 to March 1975.

228. Before ruling on this submission, the Court must examine why, as early as 1971, Loyalist terrorism was not fought with the same weapons as Republican terrorism (see paragraphs 37-38 above).
The Court finds that there were profound differences between Loyalist and Republican terrorism.
At the time in question, the vast majority of murders, explosions and other outrages were attributable to Republicans. Although Loyalists had begun towards 1963 to perpetrate acts of violence, reaching a high level in 1969 when the IRA was scarcely in evidence (see paragraphs 20-28 above), since 1970 the scale of their activities had been minute in comparison with those of the IRA (see paragraphs 29-32, 37, 45 and 47 above).
In the second place, the IRA, with its far more structured organisation, constituted a far more serious menace than the Loyalist terrorists. In 1970 and 1971 the Protestant community included political pressure groups with extremist tendencies, but apparently concealed within its ranks no underground military force akin to the IRA. At that time Loyalist terrorism was seen by the authorities as the sporadic work of individuals or isolated factions (see paragraph 37 above).
Lastly, it was as a general rule easier to institute criminal proceedings against Loyalist terrorists than against their Republican counterparts and the former were frequently brought before the courts. Accordingly, although Loyalist terrorists were not extra judicially deprived of their liberty, they do not seem to have been able to act with impunity.

229. The later period (30 March 1972 - 4 February 1973) gives rise to delicate questions.
When assuming direct rule of the province (30 March 1972), the United Kingdom Government and Parliament wished, amongst other things, to combat the discrimination long prevalent there in the area of electoral rights, employment, housing, etc., in the hope of reaching an equitable solution to the Northern Ireland problem (see paragraphs 50, 60 and 77 above).
However, this approach did not have a consequence which might have been expected, namely a complete equality of treatment between the two categories of terrorists in the exercise of the special powers. Shortly after 30 March 1972, there was a spectacular increase in Loyalist terrorism. Furthermore, the UVF proved to have increased its membership, expanded its holding of arms and improved its organisation. Towards the middle of the year, the police as a general rule had reasonably good intelligence as to the identity of violent elements on the Protestant side but there were cases in which it was impossible to procure sufficient evidence to bring them before the courts. Nevertheless, about ten months elapsed before the first two Loyalists were extra judicially deprived of their liberty (see paragraphs 52-53, 57, 61-62 and 66 above).
Several explanations for what is at first sight a surprising time-lag are advanced by the respondent Government and the Commission, for example the three combined facts that it had been decided to attempt the phasing-out of internment, that the IRA were still responsible for the great majority of serious acts of terrorism and that, broadly speaking, the ordinary criminal processes remained far more suited to the campaign against the Loyalist terrorists than to that against their Republican opponents (see paragraphs 50, 54-58, 61 and 63 above).
The cause or causes behind the conduct of the Government and the security forces at the time cannot be determined with certainty from the evidence, but it seems beyond doubt that the reasons that had been influential before 30 March 1972 became less and less valid as time went on.
However, the Court considers it unrealistic to carve into clear-cut phases a situation that was inherently changing and constantly evolving. The Court can understand the authorities’ hesitating about the course to take, feeling their way and needing a certain time to try to adapt themselves to the successive demands of an ugly crisis. On the basis of the data before it, and bearing in mind the limits on its powers of review, the Court cannot affirm that, during the period under consideration, the United Kingdom violated Article 14, taken together with Article 5 (art. 14+5), by employing the emergency powers against the IRA alone.

230. To sump up, the aim pursued until 5 February 1973 – the elimination of the most formidable organisation first of all – could be regarded as legitimate and the means employed do not appear disproportionate.
231. 5 February 1973 marked a turning-point. Thereafter, extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was used to combat terrorism as such, as defined a few months previously by the 1972 Order, and no longer just a given organisation. In point of fact, the measures were not applied against Loyalist terrorists to anything like the same extent as against the IRA (see paragraph 69 above), but the IRA were still committing the majority of the acts of terrorism (see paragraph 67 above). Furthermore, Loyalist terrorists could still be brought before the courts more easily than their Republican counterparts. Criminal proceedings were opened against many of the former and often led to convictions, above all in one particular field – sectarian assassinations (see paragraphs 67, 70 and 76 above). The Court cannot reproach the United Kingdom for having attempted to avail itself as far as possible of this procedure under the ordinary law. Taking into account, as it must, the full range of the processes of the law applied in the campaign against the two categories of terrorists, the Court finds that the initial difference of treatment did not continue during the last period considered.
232. Accordingly, no discrimination contrary to Articles 14 and 5 (art. 14+5) taken together is established.

II. ON ARTICLE 5 (art. 5)
11. holds unanimously that at the relevant time there existed in Northern Ireland a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

12. holds unanimously that the British notices of derogation dated 20 August 1971, 23 January 1973 and 16 August 1973 fulfilled the requirements of Article 15 para. 3 (art. 15-3);

13. holds by sixteen votes to one that, although the practice followed in Northern Ireland from 9 August 1971 to March 1975 in the application of the legislation providing for extrajudicial deprivation of liberty entailed derogations from paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4), it is not established that the said derogations exceeded the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

14. holds unanimously that the United Kingdom has not disregarded in the present case other obligations under international law, within the meaning of Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1);

15. holds by fifteen votes to two that no discrimination contrary to Articles 14 and 5 (art. 14+5) taken together is established…



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August 01, 2016

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Samuel Moyn

Harvard Law School

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